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This study examines whether earnings guidance contributes to investor short-
termism – excessive focus on a firm’s short term performance and insufficient 
consideration of its long-term value creation potential. Using an adaptation of Ohlson’s 
(1995) valuation model, I find that investors place significantly higher (lower) weight 
on short-term (long-term) earnings of quarterly guidance firms than on the 
corresponding earnings of non-guidance firms. Further tests indicate that the differential 
weighting cannot be fully explained by measurement errors, earnings properties, risk, or 
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. For a sample of guidance initiating firms, I find no 
differential valuations of firm value components before the initiation of guidance, but 
large differential valuations after guidance initiation. In contrast, for guidance 
discontinuation firms, I find that investors shift their focus from short-term to long-term 
earnings after the discontinuation of guidance. Together, the results support critics’ 
claim that quarterly guidance contributes to short-term fixation in the market. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The question of whether firms should provide earnings guidance continues to 
draw heated debate among practitioners and academics. One main concern raised by 
critics is that providing short-term earnings guidance contributes to investor short-
termism – excessive focus on a firm’s short term performance and insufficient 
consideration of its long-term value creation. Fuller and Jensen (2002, 2010), for 
example, urge executives to stop giving quarterly earnings forecasts, arguing that 
earnings guidance binds management and fuels the short-term expectations game in the 
equity market. Similarly, panelists participating in a roundtable discussion sponsored by 
the CFA Institute and the Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics cited 
quarterly earnings guidance as one of the primary causes of investor short-term thinking 
(e.g., Krehmeyer, Orsagh and Schacht, 2006). More recently, former U.S. Vice 
President Al Gore and former Goldman Sachs executive David Blood released a white 
paper explicitly blaming quarterly earnings guidance for investors’ overemphasis on 
short-term earnings and their negligence of long term value (Gore and Blood, 2012). 
The underlying assumption behind the claims is that investors will focus less on short-
term signals if managers do not create expectations for such signals.  
Others, however, are doubtful that Wall Street will not create its own short-term 
expectations absent management’s earnings guidance. In fact, a survey of 401 top 
financial executives (i.e., Graham, Harvey and Rojgopal, 2005) suggests that managers’ 
guidance practices are responding to a preexisting short-term focus in the market rather 
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than causing it (Miller, 2009). Discussions at the Corporate/Investor Summit also reveal 
other potential causes of investor short-termism, such as the advent of online trading 
tools, shifts in taxation policies on capital gains and increasing popularity of speculative 
funds (Tonello, 2005). Thus, it is unclear whether a company’s voluntary disclosure 
practice plays a role in investors’ short-term fixation.  
Understanding whether earnings guidance leads to excessive short-term focus is 
important because short-termism can be detrimental to the welfare of investors and the 
soundness of the market. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) show how short-horizon 
traders can create information inefficiency by “herding” responses to poor quality 
information unrelated to firms’ fundamentals.1 Investor short-termism can also pressure 
managers to make suboptimal long-term investment decisions in the form of under- or 
over-investment (Bebchuk and Stole, 1993; Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra and Venugopalan, 
2011).  
Following Abarbanell and Bernard (2000) and Bushee (2001), I adapt Ohlson’s 
(1995) residual income model to test investor shortsightedness. Ohlson’s model allows 
a firm’s value to be segregated into three components – book value, short-term earnings 
and long-term value. Using a sample from 2000 to 2009, I estimate a regression of stock 
price on the three components of firm value and find that investors assign significantly 
higher (lower) weight to the short-term (long-term) earnings of quarterly guidance firms 
                                                          
1
 Sheila Bair, former Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, argues that short-term thinking 
played a critical role in the recent financial crisis: “Investors systematically over-value short-term payoffs and pass 
up investment opportunities that could leave them much better off in the longer term. Too much short-term thinking 
can be very costly. It is a market failure that leads to underinvestment in valuable projects with long payoff periods.” 
(Bair, 2011) 
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than to the corresponding earnings of non-guidance firms.
2
 The differences in weights 
on both short-term and long-term earnings decline over time and converge close to zero 
by the end of the sample period. 
I repeat the pricing test for annual guidance firms and find no valuation 
differences on the components of firm value between annual guidance firms and control 
firms, supporting some critics’ suggestion that switching from quarterly to annual 
guidance helps firms steer investor focus away from short-term performance 
(Krehmeyer, et al., 2006; Chamber of Commerce, 2007).    
The choice to provide earnings guidance is endogenous (see Figure 1). While 
critics contend that guidance induces short-term fixation, it is also possible that 
managers are acceding to the demand of short-term investors. To establish the direction 
of causality, I perform two sets of tests. First, I examine the differential price reaction to 
the components of firm value between quarterly guidance and non-guidance firms 
before and after guidance firms initiate their first earnings guidance. The difference-in-
differences test yields no differential valuations of short-term or long-term components 
of firm value between the two groups of firms before the inception of quarterly 
guidance, but large differential valuations after the inception of earnings guidance. 
Second, I investigate the differences in valuation of firm value components between the 
two groups of firms before and after quarterly guidance firms stop issuing guidance. I 
find that investors shift their focus from short-term to long-term earnings after the 
                                                          
2
 The control firms are formed based on their propensity scores derived from estimating a logistic model with 
predictors that have been documented to be determinants of providing earnings guidance in prior studies. 
Specifically, I include the following predictors: firm size, market-to-book, past earnings volatility, past analysts’ 
forecast dispersion and number of analysts following. 
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discontinuation of guidance. Together, the results support critics’ claim that quarterly 
guidance induces short-term fixation rather than a response to the market’s preexisting 
short-term focus.  
While the finding is consistent with myopic pricing, one competing explanation 
is that short-term earnings of quarterly guidance firms are better indicators of their 
future earnings than are short-term earnings of non-guidance firms. This is consistent 
with prior literature that price-earnings relation is correlated with earnings persistence 
and future earnings growth (Kothari, 2001). Another alternative explanation is that 
investors respond more strongly to short-term earnings of quarterly guidance firms 
because they have lower risk (Kothari, 2001). To rule out these competing explanations, 
I compare earnings persistence, future earnings growth and CAPM beta (proxy for risk) 
between the two groups of firms, and I find no significant differences. I also find that 
the results remain robust after controlling for differences in analyst forecast accuracy 
and after excluding “earnings warnings” management forecasts. 
 To further confirm that the documented weighting differences are evidence of 
over- and under-valuation of respective components of firm value, I investigate future 
price reversals using two approaches. I predict that if the market over- (under-) weights 
short-term (long-term) earnings of guidance firms, price corrections will occur in the 
near future. First, I examine stock returns over the two years subsequent to the Value 
Line forecast dates. I find that one-year-ahead cumulative abnormal returns are more 
negatively (positively) associated with the short-term (long-term) earnings of guidance 
firms than with the corresponding earnings of non-guidance firms. The magnitudes of 
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cumulative abnormal returns decline over time, and the downward trend corresponds 
with the temporal decline in the differential weighting of short-term and long-term 
earnings. These results suggest that investors “learn” over time or are responding to the 
concerns expressed by the critics.  
Second, I construct three hedge portfolios that take a long (short) position in 
firms with high (low) short-term earnings to examine whether negative abnormal 
returns can be earned over the subsequent months. I form one portfolio for each 
guidance and non-guidance sample, and one portfolio capturing the difference in the 
hedge portfolio returns between guidance and non-guidance firms. The analyses yield 
limited evidence of negative abnormal returns for the guidance sample. However, I find 
negative abnormal returns in the portfolio that captures the difference in the hedge 
portfolio returns between the two groups of firms. Taken together, the future-returns 
tests provide some evidence of price correction.  
I also evaluate whether myopic pricing of quarterly guidance firms is a market-
wide phenomenon or driven by only a sub-class of investors – namely investors with a 
short-term investment horizon. At a recent CFA symposium on short-termism, the 
panelists held different views on who are responsible for fostering market myopia. 
Some pointed the finger at fund managers, while others blame the investment 
community in general (CFA Institute, 2008). Bushee (2001) classifies institutional 
investors into three groups – transient, quai-indexer, and dedicated – based on their 
investment horizon. Using his classification I find that, relative to non-guidance firms, 
quarterly guidance firms on average have a slightly larger base of transient investors 
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(6%) and a slightly higher volume turnover by transient investors (9%). However, 
subsequent pricing tests show that mispricing of quarterly guidance firms is not more 
evident among any particular sub-group of investors. These results imply that 
mispricing is a market-wide phenomenon.  
The primary contribution of this study is to inform the debate on the costs and 
benefits of earnings guidance practice. Extant literature provides abundant evidence on 
its benefits (see Miller, 2009) but very scarce evidence on the costs. The primary 
concern of regulatory bodies is that the disclosure practice leads to investor short-
termism, which can undermine the soundness of the equity market and thus decrease the 
competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets in the presence of increasing global 
competition (e.g., Chamber of Commerce, 2007). While critics repeatedly allege that 
providing earnings guidance, particularly quarterly earnings guidance, increases the 
market’s tendency to focus on short-term performance, much of the argument is based 
on their anecdotal evidence and personal experiences. This study directly tests the 
validity of the claim and adds to the list of consequences of providing management 
earnings forecasts (see Hirst, Koonce and Venkataraman, 2008).  
This study also contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature. Numerous 
studies examine the effect of the voluntary disclosure on managers’ long-term 
investment and financial reporting behavior. For example, Cheng, et al. (2007) study 
whether occasional guiders invest more or less in research and development than 
dedicated guiders; Acito (2010) and Call, Chen, Miao and Tong (2011) examine 
whether earnings guidance firms are more or less likely to manage earnings than non-
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earnings guidance firms. The basic tenet of the arguments behind these studies is that 
providing earnings guidance encourages investors to focus on short-term performance 
and it, in turn, pressures managers to act myopically. In other words, the tests conducted 
are joint tests of investor myopia and management’s investing or financial reporting 
behavior. This study complements prior work by providing empirical evidence that 
illuminates the underlying link. 
The chapters below are organized in the following order: Chapter 2 discusses the 
related literature and develops the hypotheses; Chapter 3 outlines the research design; 
Chapter 4 describes the sample and descriptive statistics; Chapter 5 reports the main 
results; Chapter 6 contains the results from additional and sensitivity analyses; and 
Chapter 7 concludes the study. 
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Chapter 2:  Motivation, Related Literature and Hypotheses  
2.1 Market Short-Termism 
The U.S stock market has been criticized for being increasingly obsessed with 
firms’ short term performance and not giving sufficient consideration to long-term 
value creation. Critics often cite increasing share turnover, shortened executive tenure, 
management myopia, and investors’ exaggerated reaction to quarterly results as 
indications of short-termism in the capital markets. Surveys and academic studies also 
lend support to the allegation. For example, Zhang (2011) estimates that short-term 
trading accounts for more than 75% of the dollar trading volume in 2009.
3
 The annual 
share turnover of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange has increased 
monotonically from 50% in 1990 to more than 100% in 2005 (Krehmeyer, et al. 2006). 
For U.S. portfolio fund managers, the IRRC Institute reports an overall average annual 
investment turnover of 77% and turnovers greater than 100% for 23% of the managers 
(IRRC Institute and Mercer, 2010). During a recent conference, Morgan Stanley asked 
chief investment officers from top asset management firms about their investment time 
horizon. The survey results reveal that only 20% of the attendees voted for more than 
one year and 55% voted for a quarter or less (Gore and Blood, 2012).    
A survey of 400 executives also shows that 80% of corporate managers are 
willing to sacrifice investments in research and development to meet short-term 
earnings targets, and 50% of them would delay new projects even if it meant sacrifices 
                                                          
3
 Zhang (2011) also finds evidence that excessive short-term trading impedes the market’s ability to incorporate news 
about firms’ fundamental values into asset prices.   
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in long-term value creation (Graham et al. 2005). The findings suggest that managers 
feel pressured by the capital market to manage for the short-term. 
Critics attribute market short-termism to firm-level and non-firm-level factors 
(see discussion in Chapter 2.2). Among the firm-level factors, voluntary disclosure 
practices receive the strongest criticism. In particular, quarterly earnings guidance is 
claimed to encourage investors to fixate on short-term earnings. The critics of short-
term guidance recommend that corporate managers replace quarterly earnings guidance 
with more meaningful communication of company strategy and long-term value drivers. 
2.2 Debate on Role of Earnings Guidance in Market Short-Termism 
Management earnings forecasts (earnings guidance) are voluntary forward-
looking statements about a firm’s future performance and a vital source of information 
for investors. Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010) document that, in terms of 
information content, management forecasts outrank all other sources of accounting-
based information such as analysts’ forecasts, earnings announcements, earnings pre-
announcements and SEC filings. Beyer et al. find that management forecasts, on 
average, account for about 55% of all accounting-based information. In spite of its 
importance, there is a declining trend in the number of firms providing quarterly 
earnings guidance over the years. Based on surveys of hundreds of firms, the National 
Investor Relations Institute finds that the number of quarterly earnings guidance firms 
has dropped from 75% in 2003, to 61% in2005, to 52% in 2006, and to 27% in 2007, 
while annual guidance has increased from 16% in 2003, to 28% in 2005, to 43% in 
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2006 and to 58% in 2007 (Chen, Matsumoto and Rajgopal, 2011). The declining trend 
in providing quarterly earnings guidance can be partially attributed to the growing 
criticism made by prominent investors, regulators and academics.  
For example, Warren Buffett has long advocated for the abandonment of short-
term earnings guidance; he advises investors to focus on a firm’s long-term strategies 
rather than on short-term performance metrics, which often are not reflective of a firm’s 
complexities. William Donaldson, former chairman of Securities and Exchange 
Commission, expresses a similar view in his comment on the recent global financial 
crisis: 
I believe the excessive focus by too many corporations on achieving 
short-term results, fanned by the practice of acceding to demands for 
regular guidance in forecasting such quarterly results—is certainly one 
of the root causes of some of the problems we face today…Through its 
effects on managerial incentives, quarterly earnings guidance plays a 
prominent role in generating short-term market pressure and a penchant 
for short-term thinking among both corporate managers and money 
managers. (Deloitte, 2009, p.12)  
 
Fuller and Jensen (2002, 2010) also make the argument that earnings guidance binds 
management and fuels the short-term expectations game in the equity market. The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce strongly recommends that firms either stop quarterly guidance 
or switch to annual guidance for similar reasons (Chamber of Commerce, 2007). Most 
recently, former U.S. Vice President Al Gore and former Goldman Sachs executive 
David Blood released a white paper (Gore and Blood, 2012) in which they argue that, 
“Quarterly earnings guidance can create incentives for executives to manage for the 
short term and encourage some investors to overemphasise the significance of these 
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measures at the expense of the longer-term, more meaningful measure of sustainable 
value creation” (p.4).  
Similar concerns were voiced by panelists at the 2006 roundtable discussion of 
market short-termism, an event sponsored by the CFA Institute and the Business 
Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics. The panelists included firms’ senior 
managements, fund managers and senior directors of non-profit investor protection 
organizations. The consensus was that firms should replace quarterly earnings guidance 
with disclosure practices that emphasize long-term fundamental values to reduce short-
term thinking in the market. 
While the critics’ messages are loud and clear, not everyone agrees with their 
contention. This is evident by the number of firms continuing to provide quarterly 
earnings guidance and the CFA Institute’s survey results that show 71% of firms have 
no preference for quarterly guidance, 24% favor the practice and only 5% oppose it. 
There are at least two reasons for the skepticism. First, regardless of their earnings 
guidance practice, firms continue to report mandatory quarterly earnings results and 
analysts continue to provide predictions of those results. It is unclear whether managers 
are able to shift the focus of the market from short-term to long-term by simply 
withholding their forecasts. In fact, Tucker (2007) finds that investors respond more 
strongly to negative quarterly earnings surprises when firms fail to provide guidance. 
Further, some prior studies (Chen, et al. 2011; Houston, Lev and Tucker, 2010) do not 
support the critics’ argument that stopping earnings guidance will lead managers to 
provide more long-term oriented information.  
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Second, there are many other factors that may cause the market to be short-term 
oriented. For instance, panelists at the Corporate/Investor Summit hosted by The 
Conference Board did not cite earnings guidance as a contributing factor to short-
termism (Tonello, 2005). Instead, they unanimously agreed that speculative trading is 
one of the major causes of market myopia. The rise of hedge funds, coupled with the 
advent of online trading tools, greatly amplifies the amount of short-term trading in the 
stock market (Zhang, 2011). The participants also argued that market short-termism 
could be caused by the shift in U.S. taxation policy on capital gains, analysts’ analytical 
training on short-horizon metrics, and changes in the commission rate system for the 
sell-side analysts.  
The preceding discussion leads to an interesting question: given all other 
contributing factors and the market’s ability to form its own short-term expectations, 
how much of a role does a firm’s voluntary disclosure practice play in fostering short-
term market operation?  
2.3 Related Studies and Hypotheses Development 
There are both costs and benefits associated with proving earnings guidance. In 
addition to containing information content, earnings guidance has been shown in prior 
studies to have many positive attributes, such as aligning market and managerial 
expectations (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984), reducing information asymmetry across market 
participants (Coller and Yohn, 1997) and mitigating post-earnings announcement drift 
(Li and Tse, 2008). Other perceived benefits of providing earnings guidance include 
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moderating firms’ share price and increasing their stock liquidity by attracting investors 
and analysts (McKinsey, 2006). The costs, however, are less well-documented in extant 
literature. Apart from time spent by management and employees, the primary reason 
behind the call for guidance cessation is that guidance may generate market short-
termism by encouraging investors to overemphasize firms’ short-term performance 
(McKinsey, 2006; Miller 2009). There are important implications for having a market 
that is overly short-term focused. First, theoretical findings in Froot, et al. (1992) 
suggest that short-horizon traders can create information inefficiency by “herding” poor 
quality information that is unrelated to the firms’ fundamentals. Zhang (2011) provides 
supporting empirical evidence that excessive short-term trading (in general) hinders the 
market’s ability to incorporate firms’ fundamental news into asset prices. Second, 
investor traders may also pressure managers to invest myopically (trading positive 
future NPV projects for near-term performance) and report opportunistically (manage 
earnings).  
In spite of the important implications, direct evidence on the relation between 
earnings guidance and investor short-termism is missing in existing literature. Figure 1 
graphically describes the conceptual relations among guidance, investor short-termism 
and managers’ investing and financial reporting decisions. As shown in the figure, 
earnings guidance may encourage investors to be overly focused on short-term 
performance, and the overemphasis in turn pressures managers to invest myopically 
and/or report opportunistically. Prior studies have examined the role of earnings 
guidance in managers’ investing and financial reporting behavior, under the maintained 
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assumption that guidance contributes to investor myopia. For example, Cheng, et al. 
(2007) compare research and development expenditures between dedicated and 
occasional guidance firms and find that dedicated guiders invest significantly less in 
R&D and are more likely to meet or beat analyst consensus. The findings are consistent 
with the survey results in Graham, et al. (2005), who find that 80% of the respondents 
state they would invest less in research and development, advertising, and maintenance 
in order to meet short-term earnings targets.  
Other studies investigate whether managers of guidance firms are more likely to 
manage earnings to meet/beat their quarterly benchmarks than non-guidance firms. For 
instance, Kasznik (1999) finds that managers of guidance firms manipulate reported 
earnings towards their own forecasts. Similarly, Acito (2010) documents that guidance 
firms recognize large abnormal accruals to beat their own forecasts but not analysts’ 
forecasts, whereas non-guidance firms use abnormal accruals to beat analysts’ forecasts. 
However, Acito finds no difference in the aggregate level of earnings management 
between the two types of firms; they manage earnings to meet different benchmarks. In 
contrast, Call, Chen, Miao and Tong (2011) show that guidance firms engage in less 
earnings management than non-guidance firms. Their results are more consistent with 
Dutta and Gigler’s (2002) theoretical prediction that earnings guidance can deter 
earnings management by expanding the available set of contractible information to 
include both forecasted earnings and reported earnings. 
In short, prior studies provide only indirect evidence on the relation between 
earnings guidance and investor shortsightedness. The mixed results, coupled with the 
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divergent views of market constituents (discussed in the Chapter 2.2) cast doubt on 
whether guidance contributes to market myopia. Accordingly, I state the first hypothesis 
in the null form: 
H1a: Investors do not over- (under-) value short-term (long-term) earnings of 
quarterly earnings guidance firms more than short-term (long-term) earnings of 
non-guidance firms.  
I limit H1a to include only quarterly guidance firms because a vast majority of 
critics accuse it for being the main contributor to short-term thinking. In fact, some 
critics suggest that switching from quarterly to annual guidance helps reduce or 
eliminate investor myopia. Given that the trend is to shift the forecast horizon from 
quarterly to annual, I separately test the effect of annual earnings guidance:  
H1b: Investors do not over- (under-) value short-term (long-term) earnings of 
annual earnings guidance firms more than short-term (long-term) earnings of 
non-guidance firms.  
If the results support the allegation that earnings guidance leads to excessive 
short-term focus, then a natural question arises: Is the phenomenon driven by the market 
as a whole or by only a sub-set of investors, such as those with a short investment 
horizon? Bushee (1998) categorizes a firm’s institutional owners into three types: 
transient, quasi-index and dedicated. The transient institutions represent the group that 
has a high volume turnover and is very sensitive to earnings news; the quasi-index 
institutions consist of those with low turnover and relatively low trading sensitivity to 
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earnings news; and the dedicated institutions are the group that exhibits mostly buy-
and-hold strategies. Bushee (2001) documents two important findings. First, he finds 
that transient investors have a preference for firms with more near-term earnings over 
firms with more long-run value. Second, high levels of transient ownership are 
associated with an over- (under-) valuation of short-term (long-term) expected earnings. 
These results suggest that transient investors overemphasize a set of information that is 
not related to the firms’ fundamental value. Thus, it is plausible that transient investors 
are more attracted to guidance firms because management’s short-term earnings 
forecasts facilitate their short-term trading strategies and the larger transient ownership 
aggravates the myopic pricing. I formalize the hypothesis in the alternative form: 
H2: The over- (under-) valuation of short-term (long-term) earnings of guidance 
firms is more pronounced when guidance firms have a larger base of transient 
institutional investors. 
A finding of no results for H2 implies that the myopic mispricing is more likely a 
market-wide phenomenon.  
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Chapter 3:  Research Methodology and Variable Construction 
3.1 Price Reaction Test 
 I utilize an adaption of Ohlson’s (1995) residual income model (also see 
Abarbanell and Bernard, 2000; Bushee, 2001; hereafter AB and Bushee) to examine the 
differences in investors’ pricing reaction to the short-term and long-term expected 
earnings of guidance firms and the corresponding earnings of non-guidance firms.
4
 The 
model decomposes a firm’s equity into two components – book value and future 
abnormal earnings:  
 
          ∑(   )
  
 
   
 
  (                )                                    ( )  
 
where Pt is the equity price at time t, bvt is the book value at time t, r is the discount rate 
and xt+τ is the earnings at time t+τ. The firm-specific discount rate is derived from the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) using firm-specific betas with an assumed risk 
premium over the risk-free rate of 7%.
5
 The book value component represents the 
portion of firm value that has been recorded by the accounting system. The last 
component of the equation is the expected future abnormal earnings, calculated as the 
expectation of the difference between earnings and prior book value times a required 
rate of return.  
                                                          
4 AB argue that while clean surplus may not be representative of firms’ actual accounting system, it still provides a 
sound structure for valuation purposes. 
 
5 See Chapter 3.6 for more detailed descriptions of Value Line dataset and the calculations of firm specific risk and 
firm value components. 
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The earnings component can be further segregated into short-term and long-
term. The Value Line dataset provides forecasts of book value, earnings and implicit 
value of price up to four years ahead, and these forecasts are used as proxies for market 
expectations. Following prior studies, I define the short-term component as one-year-
ahead expected abnormal earnings and the long-term component as the sum of all 
expected abnormal earnings beyond the one-year horizon. Note that by re-arranging 
Equation (1), a firm’s price-to-book value at any given time t can be expressed in the 
follow form:    
 
  (          )  ∑ (   )
  
 
     
 
  (                )                    ( )  
 
 
Equation (2) is useful because it allows Value Line analysts’ forecast of implicit price at 
T=4 to proxy for all expected abnormal earnings beyond T=4 (or terminal value). 
Substituting Equation (2) into Equation (1) yields the following equation: 
    
         (   )
     (            ) 
             ∑(   )   
 
   
  (                   )  (     )
     (            )  
                                                                                                     (3),  
 
where BVt is the book value at time t, PVAXt  is the present value of forecasted one-year-
ahead abnormal earnings, and PVTVt  is the present value of all forecasted abnormal 
earnings beyond the one-year horizon.   
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Equation (3) can further be written in a regression form: 
                                                                                                 ( )  
The    coefficient captures market pricing of the firm’s book value – the portion of firm 
value that has been captured by the accounting system, and    and    capture market 
pricing of expected short-term and long-term earnings, respectively. That is, since 
PVAX and PVTV are discounted values, a one dollar increase in expected short-term or 
long-term abnormal earnings should only increase price by a dollar. Market efficiency 
predicts that              and       This condition requires that the valuation 
model is complete and the components are measured without error. Since PVAX and 
PVTV are likely measured with error, their coefficients are likely to deviate from the 
theoretical value of one.
6
 The price, Pt, on the left hand side of Equation (4) is the 
observed actual price, and it can deviate from the theoretical price implied by the right 
hand side if investors over- or under-weight the components of firm value.  
To test H1a and H1b, I add an indicator variable, GUIDE, to the base model to 
capture the differential effect between guidance and non-guidance firms:  
                                          (        )  
                          (          )    (          )                                    ( )  
where GUIDE equals one if the firm provides earnings guidance for the period and zero 
otherwise. The coefficients,    and   , represent the weights investors place on 
expected short-term and long-term earnings of non-guidance firms, respectively. The 
                                                          
6 In Chapter 6 I explain the implications of measurement errors and methodologies to mitigate the potential effect.  
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non-guidance firms serve as the baseline control group (see Chapter 3.5 for formation of 
the control sample). The model suggests that if providing earnings guidance contributes 
to market short-termism, then:    > 0 and    < 0. In other words, the weight investors 
place on the short-term (long-term) earnings of guidance firms is significantly higher 
(lower) than the theoretical value predicted by the model, relative to the weight placed 
on the corresponding earnings of non-guidance firms.  
Equation (5) is estimated yearly for quarterly and annual guidance firms, 
respectively.
7
 The firm value components are measured approximately at mid-fiscal 
year, when the second Value Line analyst report for each firm-year is released (see 
Chapter 3.6 for construction of the variables), and    is the share price on the date the 
firm value components are measured. The coefficients of each variable are averaged 
across the sample period, and the t-tests of the coefficients are based on the distribution 
of the yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West 
methodology.  
3.2 Differences in Valuation before and after Inception of Guidance 
 The choice to provide earnings guidance is endogenous (see Figure 1). While 
critics argue that guidance induces market myopia, it is also possible that managers are 
acceding to the demand of short-term investors. To test for the direction of causality, I 
examine the differential price reaction to the components of firm value between 
                                                          
7
 There are three types of earnings guidance firms: 1) firms who provide guidance for their annual performance, 2) 
firms who provide guidance for quarterly performance, and 3) firms who provide guidance for both quarterly and 
annual performance. I define the first type as Annual Guidance firms and the second and third types as Quarterly 
Guidance firms. 
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quarterly guidance and non-guidance firms before and after guidance firms initiate their 
first earnings guidance. Specially, I estimate the following difference-in-differences 
(DID) regression model: 
                                          (        )     
     (          )    (          )                       
         (       )      (         )     (         )          
          (          )      (             )  
          (               )      (               )     (6a), 
 
where POST is an indicator variable that equals zero (one) for the period two years before 
(after) firms give their first earnings guidance. I define guidance initiation year as the first 
year that a firm appears in the guidance dataset. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix.  
If quarterly earnings guidance induces investor myopia, then there should be a 
zero (significant) valuation difference between the two groups in the pre- (post-) 
guidance period, that is,         in the pre-guidance period and       and 
      in the post-guidance period. On the contrary, if quarterly guidance is managers’ 
response to a preexisting short-term condition in the market, then there should be some 
valuation differences between the two groups in the pre-guidance period and larger 
valuation differences in the post-guidance period. The latter set of results would support 
the argument that investors were short-term focused and demanded short-term 
information from management, and mangers accede to giving guidance, thereby 
exacerbating the short-term fixation.  
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3.3 Differences in Valuation before and after Discontinuation of Guidance  
To supplement the test in the preceding subchapter, I also investigate the change 
in valuation difference before and after firms stop quarterly earnings guidance: 
 
                                          (        )     
     (          )    (          )                       
         (       )      (         )     (         )          
          (          )      (             )   
                       (               )      (               )     (6b), 
                                                                                                             
where POST is an indicator variable that equals zero (one) for the year before (after) 
firms stop their quarterly guidance. I define guidance discontinuation year as the last 
year a firm is recorded in the guidance dataset, and it continues to exist in other datasets 
such as Compustat. All other variables are defined in Appendix. 
 If quarterly earnings guidance is responsible for generating excessive short-term 
focus in the market, then we should observe that myopic pricing exists when guidance 
firms provides earnings guidance and disappears when the firms discontinue the 
guidance practice, i.e.,               in the pre-discontinuation period and     = 
    = 0 in the post-discontinuation period. 
3.4 Effect of Different Types of Institutional Owners 
 The myopic pricing of guidance firms, if it exists, could be a market-wide 
phenomenon or driven by only certain type(s) of investors. Given that institutional 
investors are price-setters, I investigate whether mispricing of guidance firms only 
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exists or is more pronounced when the firm has a larger base of certain type(s) of 
institutional ownership. Bushee (1998) suggests that institutional investors are a 
heterogeneous group. Using cluster analysis, Bushee classifies institutional investors 
into three categories: transient, quasi-index, and dedicated. The transient owners 
represent the group that has a high volume turnover and is very sensitive to earnings 
news; the quasi-index owners consist of those with low turnover and relatively low 
trading sensitivity to earnings news; and the dedicated owners are the group the exhibits 
mostly buy-and-hold strategies. Given that transient investors have shorter investment 
horizons, it is plausible that they are attracted to firms who provide more short-term 
earnings information and the larger transient ownership aggravates the mispricing.  
To test the hypothesis, I add an institutional ownership variable, INST, to the 
price reaction test model (Equation (5)):   
 
                                         (        )  
     (          )    (          )                                                  
                 (       )      (         )     (         )  
                    (          )     (             )  
       (               )     (               )          (7),     
 
where INST, is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s institutional ownership 
of a given type is greater than the median value and zero otherwise.  INST=TRA_HOLD 
represents holdings by the transient group; INST=QIX_HOLD represents holdings by 
the quasi-index group; INST=DED_HOLD represents holdings by the dedicated group; 
and INST=ALL_HOLD represents holdings by all types of institutional investors. 
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Equation (7) is estimated for each of the investor groups. All other variables are 
previously defined. The three-way interaction model suggests that if a given type of 
institutional investors exacerbates the over- (under-) valuation of short-term (long-term) 
earnings, then    > 0 and    < 0.  
3.5 Formation of Control Sample 
Prior research suggests that firms’ decision to issue earnings guidance is an 
endogenous choice influenced by many firm characteristics and the environment in 
which they operate. For example, Hutton (2005) finds that a firm is more likely to issue 
earnings guidance when the firm is followed by more analysts, has higher market-to-
book ratio and has earnings that are more difficult to predict. Tuna and Wysocki (2006) 
document that earnings guidance is more likely when analysts’ forecast dispersion is 
low. To control for potential influence of these factors on investors’ firm valuation, I 
match guidance firms with non-guidance firms based on the propensity scores derived 
from estimating the following logistic model:
8 
 
 
     (        )   (                                   
                                                          )            (8), 
 
where SIZEt-1 = natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at year t-1, M2Bt-1 = natural 
log of a firm’s market-to-book ratio at year t-1, EARN_STDt = earnings volatility over 
the past 12 quarters, with a minimum of eight available quarters, NANALYSTSt-1 = 
                                                          
8
 The control firms are matched, with replacement, to the guidance firms on a one-to-one basis. The results from the 
logistic regressions are reported in Table 16. 
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number of analysts following the firm in the last quarter of year t-1, and AF_DISPERt-1 
= analysts’ forecast dispersion in the last quarter of year t-1.9 Equation (8) is estimated 
yearly and the control firms are matched to the guidance firms based on the closest 
propensity score.  
3.6 Value Line and Construction of Firm Value Components 
The Value Line data files contain analyst’s forecasts of earnings, book value and 
implicit price for the next fiscal year, the year after, and a long-range period labeled 
“three-to-five years” ahead. Consistent with AB and Bushee, I define the “three-to-five 
years” forecasts as forecasts for four years ahead. The three-years-ahead forecast is 
obtained by interpolating between the two-years-ahead and four-years-ahead forecasts. 
With availability of these forecasts from one to four years ahead, I construct firms’ 
short-term and long-term value components. Specifically, I define a firm’s short-term 
value component as the difference between the forecasted one-year-ahead earnings and 
the forecasted one-year-ahead book value, discounted to the present period. Value Line 
publishes four forecasts for a given year and the second forecast is chosen for the 
purpose of calculating the variables. Since the second forecast is made around midway 
through the year, the short-term value component is discounted to the present period for 
the number of remaining months until the year-end. For example, if a firm’s first Value 
Line forecast is made in June and has a fiscal year-end of December, then its short-term 
value component is discounted for about six months. 
                                                          
9
 The Value Line analyst forecasts are made by one analyst. Since the variables – NANALYSTS and AF_DISPER – 
require more than one analyst forecast, they are calculated using the IBES data files. 
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I define a firm’s expected long-term value component as follows: First, I 
calculate the expected terminal value (share price at T=4) by multiplying the forecasted 
four-year-ahead P/E ratio by the forecasted four-year-ahead earnings. Next, I subtract 
the expected book value four years ahead from the expected terminal value to obtain the 
firm’s expected abnormal earnings beyond T=4. Then, I add this calculated value to the 
sum of abnormal earnings from one to four years ahead to arrive at the long-term value 
component. Finally, the long-term value component is discounted to the present period 
using the same methodology as the short-term value component. Figure 2 provides a 
timeline illustrating the approximate timing of Value Line forecasts in relation to the 
timing of management earnings forecasts.  
The firm-specific discount rate used to discount short-term and long-term values 
is calculated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM); the discount rate equals 
risk-free rate, plus beta times an assumed market risk of 7%. The firm-specific beta for 
each period is provided in Value Line database, and is derived from a regression 
analysis between weekly percent changes in the price of a stock and weekly percent 
changes in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index over a period of five years. 
The betas are adjusted for dividends, stock-splits and time-trend. The risk-free rate for a 
given period is proxied by the U.S. Treasury Security yield for the corresponding time 
horizon. 
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Chapter 4:  Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Sample 
Table 1 outlines the sample selection procedures. First, I include all firm-years 
between 1993 and 2009 in the COMPUSTAT dataset. The sample begins in 1993 
because the Thomson Reuters Earnings Guidance dataset starts in 1994 and the extra 
year is needed to calculate lagged values of variables. After trimming firms with 
missing accounting data in the sample year or without earnings data for the prior 
minimum of past eight quarters, the sample contains 91,587 firm-years. Second, I merge 
the COMPUSTAT sample with IBES data to obtain analyst forecast variables. The 
matching keeps 46,328 firm-years with non-missing analyst forecast data items. Third, I 
merge the resulting sample with the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings dataset and 
with Bushee’s institutional investor classification dataset to acquire trading volume, 
holdings of institutional investors and institutional investor type. Institutional managers 
with more than $100 million in Asset Under Management are required to file with the 
SEC and report their quarterly holdings and transactions. The remaining sample 
contains 37,538 firm-years.
10
  
Fourth, I add Value Line analysts’ forecasts of future firm value components to 
the sample. Value Line dataset provides forecasts of firms’ book value, earnings-per-
share and implicit stock price up to four-years ahead. I also require the observations to 
                                                          
10
 The institutional investor classification data is available on Professor Bushee’s academic website:  
http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html.  
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have non-missing stock prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices for the 
Value Line forecast dates, retaining 19,261 firm-years. Lastly, I add management 
earnings forecasts to the sample, and the final sample contains 4,559 firm-years with 
quarterly management earnings forecasts and 2,142 firm-years with annual management 
earnings forecasts. The final sample period begins in 2000 because, after deleting firm-
years with missing data items, the annual samples prior to that all have less than 20 
observations. Including these small annual samples may introduce large noise into the 
regression estimations.
11
 Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of firm-years, 
including the matching control firms, over the sample period.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the key variables and the results from 
univariate tests of differences between the variables for guidance and non-guidance 
firms.
12
 The average share price for guidance firms is about $33.32, suggesting that 
these are likely large size firms. Subsequent tests reveal that about 77% of guidance 
firms have market capitalization greater than or equal to the centile of all firms listed on 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. The high percentage of large firms is partially due to the 
data item requirements throughout the sample formation procedures. The guidance 
firms’ average book value, short-term earnings and long-term earnings are $12.24, 
                                                          
11
 Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was passed in 2000. Before the SEC adopted Reg FD, companies were 
allowed to selectively disclose material nonpublic information to certain individuals or entities. Therefore, one 
benefit of excluding firm-years before 2000 is that it mitigates the concern that non-guidance firms provided 
“guidance” to investors through different channels other than the formal earnings guidance. 
   
12
 A review of the distribution of each firm value component shows that there are extreme values. Thus, I winsorize 
the top and bottom 1% of BV, PVAX and PVTV. I also require firms to have a share price of $2 or higher.  
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$0.44 and $23.49, respectively. The sum of the three firm value components is $36.17, 
slightly higher than their average price of $33.32. The small difference suggests that 
Ohlson’s model, fitted with Value Line analysts’ forecasts, provides a reasonably sound 
structure for firm valuation. Unsurprisingly, the short-short earnings component is only 
a small portion (1.2%=$0.44/$36.17) of projected firm value. T-tests show that 
guidance firms’ prices and their components are not economically different from those 
of control firms. 
 The table also shows that institutional investors own about 85% (74%) of 
guidance firms’ (non-guidance firms’) shares. Guidance firms have significantly higher 
trading volume than non-guidance firms (101% versus 81%). The differences in 
holdings and volume are accounted for by the larger bases and trading volume of 
transient and quasi-index investors among guidance firms. Since guidance and non-
guidance firms are matched based their propensity scores, differences should not exist 
in the variables used to predict the scores. As expected, values of the control variables – 
EARN_STD, SIZE, M2B, NANALYSTS and AF_DISPER – are very similar between the 
two groups of firms.  
 Table 3 reports the results from correlation analyses. The top half of the table 
contains Spearman correlations and the bottom half shows Pearson correlations. In both 
samples, the correlation between PVAX and PVTV is highly positive, indicating that 
higher short-term earnings do not translate into lower forecasts of future performance. 
Institutional holdings (ALL_HOLD) is most highly correlated with transient trading 
volume (TRA_VOL) and least correlated with dedicated trading volume (DED_VOL), 
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suggesting that institutional ownership generates disproportionately large amount of 
short-term trading. The control variables, particularly SIZE and M2B, are correlated 
with price (P) and its components. Thus, controlling for these covariates helps reduce 
omitted variable bias in subsequent multivariate tests. 
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Chapter 5:  Main Results 
5.1 Evidence of Differential Valuation  
 Table 4 reports the results from the price-level test. The left columns show the 
results for annual guidance firms and the right columns present the results for quarterly 
guidance firms. The regressions are estimated yearly and the coefficients presented are 
the mean coefficients across the sample period. The p-values are two-tailed and are 
based on a standard error calculated from the distribution of those yearly coefficients, 
adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West methodology.  
The intercepts of both groups deviate from the theoretical value of zero, 
indicating that the firm value components are measured with error or that the 
parsimonious model is not complete. The coefficient on BV (  ) represents the effect of 
book value on share price for the control firms and is slightly higher than the predicted 
value of one. Regardless of the cause of deviation from the theoretical values, the 
coefficients on the firm value components of non-guidance firms can serve as the 
baseline benchmarks against which the coefficients of guidance firms are compared 
(Bushee, 2001). The main variables of interest in the table are GUIDE*PVAX and 
GUIDE*PVTV. The coefficients (   and   ) on the interaction terms capture the 
incremental effect of guidance firms on the relation between price (P) and the future 
earnings components. For the annual guidance group, the coefficients are 0.69 and -
0.025, respectively, but they are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This 
finding supports the null hypothesis (H1b) and some critics’ claim that annual earnings 
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guidance does not induce investor shortsightedness. For the quarterly guidance sample, 
   and    are 1.45 and -0.25, respectively, and they are statistically significant at the 
five percent level. The result shows that investors place much higher (lower) weight on 
the short-term (long-term) earnings of quarterly guidance firms than on the 
corresponding earnings of control firms, a finding that rejects H1a. Since I fail to reject 
the null hypothesis for the annual guidance group, subsequent tests are only conducted 
for the quarterly guidance sample.     
 Figure 3 reveals the temporal patterns in the magnitudes of    and    (column 8 
of Table 4) over the sample period. The top graph represents the three-year moving 
averages of    (overvaluation of short-term earnings of quarterly guidance firms), and 
the bottom graph captures the moving averages of    (undervaluation of long-term 
earnings of quarterly guidance firms). Interestingly, the graphs show a steady decline 
(increase) in investors’ overvaluation (undervaluation) of short-term (long-term) 
earnings. The averages of both coefficients converge close to zero by the end of the 
sample period, suggesting that investors learn over time or are responding to the 
concerns expressed by the critics.   
One possible explanation for differences in the results between the annual and 
quarterly guidance samples is the difference in sample size between the two samples. 
For example, the average annual sample size of quarterly guidance firms is more than 
twice as large as that of annual guidance firms. Thus, a larger sample size of quarterly 
guidance firms may contribute to the finding of statistically significant coefficients on 
their firm value components. To investigate the possibility, I reconstruct a reduced 
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quarterly guidance sample by randomly selecting a number of quarterly guidance firms 
each year that equals to the number of annual guidance firms. The results in Table 5 
show that    and    remain statistically significant, suggesting that the results of 
quarterly guidance firms are not primarily driven by the difference in sample size.   
5.2 Direction of Causality 
Table 6 contains results of the guidance initiation test. The coefficients shown in 
column three represent the weights on the firm value components of guidance and 
control firms before guidance firms initiate the first quarterly earnings guidance. Of 
special interest are the coefficients on GUIDE*PVAX (b6) and GUIDE*PVTV (b7), 
which capture the differential valuation of short-term and long-term firm value 
components, respectively. As the table indicates, both coefficients are not statistically 
different from zero at the 10 percent level, suggesting that there is no differential 
weighting of firm value components before guidance firm begin issuing earnings 
forecast. Column five reports the differential valuation of firm value components after 
guidance firms have issued the first earnings guidance. The incremental weight on the 
short-term earnings of guidance firms increases from 0.560 before the issuance of 
guidance to 3.774 after the guidance, while the incremental weight on their long-term 
earnings decreases from -0.054 to -0.241. The differences in the incremental weight 
across the pre and post periods are captured by b14 and b15 and are reported in column 
six. The coefficients are 3.214 and -0.187, respectively, and they are statistically 
significant at the 10 percent threshold.  
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 To triangulate the guidance initiation test, I investigate the change in differential 
valuation after firms permanently discontinue the guidance practice. Column three of 
Table 7 contains the parameter estimates for the guidance and control firms before 
guidance firms discontinue quarterly earnings guidance. The coefficients on 
GUIDE*PVAX (b6) and GUIDE PVTV (b7) are 1.163 and -0.156, respectively. 
Consistent with the results documented in Table 4, the coefficients suggest that 
investors assign higher (lower) weight on the short-term (long-term) earnings of 
guidance firms than on the corresponding earnings of the control firms. However, when 
firms stop providing guidance I find opposite results, that is, investor assign lower 
(higher) weight on the short-term (long-term) earnings of guidance firms. The 
coefficient b6 decreases to -1.800 and b7 increases to 0.227, indicating that investors 
redirect their attention from short-term to long-term when quarterly guidance is 
discontinued.  The differences in the differential weight across the pre and post periods 
are reported in column six. The coefficients on POST*GUIDE*PVAX and 
POST*GUIDE*PVTV are -2.962 and 0.384, respectively, and they are statistically 
significant at the five percent level. Taken together, the guidance initiation and 
discontinuation tests suggest that quarterly earnings guidance induces myopic pricing of 
guidance firms, rather than a response to the existing demand from short-term investors.  
5.3 Effect of Institutional Investors on Myopic Pricing 
Table 8 reports the multivariate results from estimating Equation (7). The 
regression analysis is based on the price-level model (Equation (5)), with the addition of 
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an indicator variable for the specific type of institutional investors. The variable, INST, 
equals one if the firm’s institutional ownership of a given type is greater than the 
median value and zero otherwise. The results in columns three, four and five pertain to 
transient, quasi-index and dedicated institutional investors, respectively. Column six 
contains the results for total institutional ownership – the sum of all three types. The 
regressions are estimated yearly and the coefficients presented are the mean coefficients 
across the sample period. The p-values are two-tailed and are based on a standard error 
calculated from the distribution of those yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial 
correlation using Newey-West methodology.    
 The coefficients on GUIDE*PVAX and GUIDE*PVTV capture the incremental 
weights on the respective firm value components for firms whose specified type of 
institutional investors is below the median. Both coefficients are statistically significant 
when the indicator variable is transient, quasi-index, or all types of institutional 
investors. The results suggest that myopic pricing exists even when the firms have low 
transient institutional investors. The primary variables of interest are the three-way 
interaction terms, INST*GUIDE*PVAX and INST*GUIDE*PVTV, which capture the 
incremental effect of the specific type of institutional ownership on the relation between 
quarterly guidance and the firm value components. For example, a positive (negative) 
coefficient on INST*GUIDE*PVAX would suggest that having a larger base of the 
given type of institution investors exacerbates (reduces) the overvaluation of quarterly 
guidance firms. For transient investors, b14 and b15 are directionally inconsistent with 
H2, but they are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, the results fail 
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to reject the hypothesis. Additional tests on quasi-index, dedicated and total institutional 
investors yield similar results.  
As a form of sensitivity test, I also estimate Equation (7) with 1) INST being a 
continuous variable and 2) decile-ranked INST that equals one if the institutional 
ownership of a given type is in the top decile and zero otherwise. The results (not 
reported) remain qualitatively unchanged. Taken together, the findings suggest that 
myopic pricing of quarterly guidance firms are not limited to transient or any other 
group of institutional investors; rather, it is a market-wide phenomenon.    
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Chapter 6:  Alternative Explanations and Robustness Tests 
6.1 Measurement Errors and Future-returns Test 
AB suggest that the evidence of myopic pricing documented in Equation (5) 
could be an artifact of two potential forms of measurements error: error in the 
estimation of discount rates and error in expectations of firm value components. 
Discount rates are estimated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and are 
assumed to be constant over time. To the extent that the rates have an upward-sloping 
term structure, the estimate of the discounted long term component would be overstated, 
leading to a downward bias on the coefficient b3. However, AB also show that only an 
extreme error in the term structure can have a significant impact on the coefficients.
13
  
It’s also worth noting that this study examines the differential valuation of the 
firm value components. Provided that the level of measurement errors is similar 
between the two groups of firms, the comparison results remain unbiased. Thus, for the 
discount rate error to bias the coefficients b6 and b7 in Equation (5), it must be the case 
that the term structures are very different between the two groups of firms. Given that 
the treatment and control firms are matched on several dimensions it is unlikely that the 
results are driven by error in the discount rates.
14
  
                                                          
13
 I also re-estimate the regression analyses using 5% or 9% assumed market risk and find that results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. 
 
14
 The results in Table 15 (discussed in Chapter 6.5) also show that there is only a small difference in CAPM beta. 
Since the discount rate is calculated as the risk-free rate, plus beta times an assumed market, a small difference in 
beta produces only an insignificant difference in the discount rate.  
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The second form of measurement error relates to error in the measurement of 
firm value components. The measurement error could explain the documented 
differential valuation if the error is significantly different between the treatment and 
control firms. I present more in-depth analyses of this possibility in Chapter 6.3.  
To mitigate the measurement error concerns, I conduct a future-returns test to 
investigate whether buy-and-hold abnormal returns of guidance firms over t+1 and t+2 
are negatively (positively) associated with their current short-term (long-term) earnings. 
AB argue that if the results are not an artifact of measurement errors then mispricing 
should subsequently reverse when future earnings are realized (or when long-term 
earnings become short-term earnings).   
 I perform the future-returns test by estimating the following regression model:    
 
   ( )                                       
                       (         )     (           )       
                       (           )                                                                  ( )    
 
The cumulative abnormal return, CAR(I), is the monthly compounded size-adjusted 
returns cumulated over period I, where I=1 for one year and I=2 for two years. The 
compounding begins one month after Value Line analysts’ forecast date (t=0) and ends 
13 months (25 months) after the date for I=1 (I=2). Since the firm value components are 
constructed using the second Value Line report released during the fiscal year, the 
compounding date on average begins around the mid-fiscal year. The size-adjusted 
returns are calculated as the difference between the raw returns of the firm over the 
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specified period and the contemporaneous returns of an equally-weighted size decile 
control portfolio using all available firms traded on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.
15
 
The variables BVC, PVAXC and PVTVC are price-deflated values of BV, PVAX and 
PVTV, respectively.  
  Recall that a positive b6 on            and a negative b7 on  
           in Equation (5) suggest that investors place too much (little) weight on 
short-term earnings (long-term) earnings of guidance firms. If the coefficients truly 
capture over- (under-) valuation of guidance firms’ short-term (long-term) earnings, 
then subsequent returns should be negatively associated with           C (b6 < 0) 
and positively associated with             (b7 > 0) in Equation (9).   
Column three (four) of Table 9 presents the results from the regression analysis 
for the non-guidance (guidance) firms. The    (  ) coefficient captures the association 
between current short-term (long-term) earnings and the future abnormal returns. I find 
that the non-interacted coefficients for both samples are not statistically significant. The 
non-significant coefficient of the guidance sample does not support the myopic pricing 
explanation and it could be due to measurement errors in the calculation of firm value 
components.  
However, the coefficients on           C (  ) and           C (  ) 
are both significantly different from zero and directionally consistent with the price 
reversal explanation. Specifically,    is negative (-0.629) and    is positive (0.044) for 
                                                          
15 To calculate the reference portfolios’ returns, I first divide all NYSE firms into deciles based on their firm size. 
Then, I assign AMEX and NASDAQ firms to the deciles according to their firm size. Lastly, I calculate the average 
monthly returns for each size decile and compound them over the specified period. 
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the one-year-ahead returns test. The coefficients suggest that future returns are more 
negatively (positively) associated with short-term (long-term) earnings of guidance 
firms than with those of the control firms. These results provide some support that 
investors subsequently make pricing adjustments to correct for previous over- (under-) 
valuation of expected short-term (long-term) earnings.  
Figure 4 shows the temporal patterns in the magnitudes of pricing adjustments. 
The top graph represents the three-year moving averages of    from column 5 of Table 
9, and the bottom graph captures the moving averages of    . The order of the graphs is 
reversed for the purpose of comparison with Figure 3. As shown in the graphs, the 
magnitudes of adjustments for both short-term and long-term earnings converge close to 
zero by the end of the sample period, and the declining patterns correspond with those 
in Figure 3.     
6.2 Measurement Errors and Hedge Portfolio Returns Tests 
 In addition to the future-returns test, I also construct hedge portfolios to examine 
whether future abnormal returns can be earned. To form the portfolios, I decile-rank 
firms based on their proportion of short-term earnings over the share price [PVAX/P]. 
Firms in the highest (lowest) decile represent those with relatively high (low) short term 
earnings expectations and/or relatively low (high) long term earnings expectations. The 
portfolios take a long position in firms that are in the highest decile and a short position 
in firms that are in the lowest decile. Then, I regress the monthly differences in returns 
between the two deciles of firms on a set of control variables: 
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Rp = α + b1HML + b2MRFR + b3SML + e      (10) 
 
where Rp is the equally weighted monthly returns of the hedge portfolios; SML, MRFR 
and HML are size, market premium and book-to-market factors (see Fama and French 
(1993) for the construction of these factors). Firms remain in the portfolios for the 
specified number of months (6, 12 or 18 months) after portfolio formation (the time 
when the second Value Line report for the fiscal year is released), and the portfolios are 
reset yearly. The hedge portfolio abnormal returns are captured by the intercept, α.  
 If investors overvalue (undervalue) short-term (long-term) earnings of guidance 
firms, then the hedge portfolio should generate negative abnormal returns, i.e., α < 0. 
Panel A of Table 10 presents the results for the guidance sample. The intercepts for the 
6-month, 12-month and 18-month tests are -0.020, -0.007 and -0.007, respectively. The 
coefficients are directionally consistent with price reversal explanation; however, only 
the coefficient for the 6-month window is statistically significant. To the extent that the 
abnormal returns represent price correction, it is surprising that mispricing is fully 
reversed in a 6-month window given that future earnings have yet been revealed. One 
plausible explanation may be that the revelation of one-year-ahead actual earnings helps 
investors realize their overvaluation of short-term earnings expectation and helps them 
adjust their expectations of future earnings accordingly.  
Panel B reports the coefficients for non-guidance firms. The intercepts for the 6-
month, 12-month and 18-month tests are -0.004, 0.012 and 0.011, respectively; 
however, they are not statistically different from zero. The results suggest that investors 
do not myopically price the control firms.  
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In Panel C, I form a third portfolio to examine whether the abnormal returns 
generated by guidance and non-guidance firms are different. A finding of more negative 
abnormal returns for guidance firms would support the claim that investors myopically 
value their firm value components. The monthly portfolio returns are calculated as the 
difference in monthly portfolio returns between the guidance and non-guidance 
portfolios. As the results indicate, the portfolio generates negative abnormal returns in 
both the 12-month and 18-month window. Lastly, Panel D presents the results from the 
mean-comparison tests of monthly portfolio returns between the guidance and non-
guidance portfolios. The results from the univariate tests suggest that the hedge 
portfolio of guidance firms, on average, perform less well than that of non-guidance 
firms over a 12-month window. Consistent with the results from the future-return tests 
(reported in Table 9), the overall results from the hedge portfolio tests provide some 
limited evidence that investors subsequently correct for their over-weighting (under-
weighting) of guidance firms’ short-term (long-term) earnings.  
6.3 Analyses of Regression Residuals and Analysts’ Forecast Errors 
 Discussions in Chapter 6.1 suggest that measurement error in the discount rate is 
unlikely the explanation for the documented differential valuation of quarterly guidance 
firms. In this subchapter, I evaluate the potential effect of the second form of 
measurement error, which relates to the calculation of firm value components. The 
measurement error could explain the differential valuation if the error is significantly 
different between quarterly guidance and control firms. Prior studies suggest that 
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management guidance helps analysts make more accurate earnings forecasts (Chen, 
Matsumoto and Rajgopal, 2011). Thus, if analysts’ forecasts of future earnings are more 
accurate for guidance firms than for non-guidance firms, then it is not surprising that 
investors place higher weight on the short-term earnings of guidance firms (Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1991). 
 To evaluate the potential bias, I examine the residuals from regression Equation 
(5) for the quarterly guidance sample: 
Pjt = b0 + b1BVjt + b2PVAXjt + b3PVTVjt + b4GUIDEjt + b5(GUIDE*BV)jt      
         + b6(GUIDE*PVAX)jt + b7(GUIDE*PVTV)jt + ɛjt. 
The ɛjt is the residual value of firm j at time t, and all other variables are defined 
in Appendix. Panel A of Table 11 presents the mean residuals in signed and absolute 
values and the mean variance of the residuals. The mean signed residuals are zero for 
both the quarterly guidance and non-guidance samples, and a graphical analysis (not 
reported) suggests that the residuals of both samples are normally distributed. The mean 
variance of the residuals is 143.256 for guidance firms and 144.776 for non-guidance 
firms. The difference of -1.520 is statistically insignificant, indicating that the residuals 
are homoscedastic. However, the mean absolute residuals for the guidance and non-
guidance samples are 7.939 and 8.437, respectively; the difference is -0.498 and is 
statistically significant. To better gauge the scale of the difference, I estimate the 
strength of correlation between the indicator variable GUIDE and each of the three 
measures of residuals. Unsurprisingly, the correlation coefficients in Panel B show that 
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the only statistically significant correlation is between GUIDE and the absolute value of 
residuals, and the correlation is weak (r = -0.028).  
The small difference in absolute residuals is mostly likely caused by the 
differential accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts between guidance and control 
firms. To investigate the possibility, I compare analysts’ earnings forecast errors 
between the two groups of firms. Panel A of Table 12 reports the mean Value Line 
analysts’ forecast error for the one-, two-, three- and four-year-ahead earnings over the 
sample period. The forecast error is calculated as the absolute value of the difference 
between actual and forecasted earnings reported by Value Line, scaled by share price at 
t-1. The results show that analysts’ forecast of one-year-ahead earnings are more 
accurate for guidance firms. However, there are no significant differences in forecast 
accuracy for the two-, three- and four-year-ahead earnings.  
The differential accuracy of analyst earnings forecast for the one-year-ahead 
earnings could influence the weight on the short-term earnings. To investigate that 
possibility, I decompose the aggregate one-year-ahead forecast error by year. The 
results in Panel B of Table 12 show that the difference in the aggregate one-year-ahead 
forecast error is driven by differences in years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2008. While the 
annual differences may contribute to the evidence of overvaluation of short-term 
earnings, they are unlikely the only explanation for the documented differential 
valuation. For example, Figure 3 shows that there is a large overvaluation of short-term 
earnings in 2000, and yet there is no difference in analyst forecast error for that year. 
Likewise, results (not reported) shows that there is no overvaluation of short-term 
45 
 
earnings in 2008, but the difference in analyst forecast error for that year is the largest 
of the sample period.  
Nonetheless, to further mitigate the effect of differential analyst forecast 
accuracy, I redefine the matching criteria to include the one-year-ahead forecast error as 
an additional factor. The control firms are matched to guidance firms based on the 
propensity scores derived from estimating the logistic model annually (Equation (8)). 
By construction, the matched guidance and control firms should have very similar 
analyst forecast error each year. Table 13 provides the results from re-estimating the 
relation between price and firm value components (Equation (5)). Similar to those 
reported in Table 4, the coefficients on GUIDE*PVAX and GUIDE*PVTV are 1.489 
and -0.351, respectively.  
In summary, the results from the analyses of residuals and analysts’ forecast 
errors suggest that the differential valuation of quarterly guidance firms’ earnings short-
term earnings is unlikely caused by measurement errors in the construction of firm 
value components. 
6.4 Effect of “Earnings Warnings” Guidance 
 
 The original samples used to estimate Equation (5) include all types of earnings 
guidance. One concern is that the higher weight placed on the short-term earnings of 
quarterly guidance firms is primarily driven by “earnings warnings” guidance. The 
conjecture is that investors will respond more to the expectation of one-year-ahead 
earnings if management provides warnings of earnings shortfall through guidance. To 
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mitigate the concern, I re-estimate Equation (5) using a sample that excludes earnings 
warnings observations. I exclude earnings warnings guidance utilizing two different 
approaches. The first approach involves removing firm-years that contain less than two 
management earnings forecasts. These sporadic management forecasts are more likely 
management’s attempts to warn investors of poor performance for the upcoming year. 
The second approach removes firm-years that contain management forecasts that are all 
labeled by Value Line as “earnings shortfall” guidance. This type of guidance by nature 
consists of management forecasts made to warn investors about firms’ likelihood of 
missing the market’s earnings expectations.  
 Column three in Table 14 presents the results under the first approach. The 
coefficients on GUIDE*PVAV and GUIDE*PVTV are 1.455 and -0.219, respectively. 
Column four reports the results under the second approach. The coefficients on 
GUIDE*PVAV and GUIDE*PVTV are 1.977 and -0.212, respectively. The values on 
the coefficients are very similar to those reported using the original sample (Table 4). 
Thus, this set of tests suggests that the evidence of differential valuation of quarterly 
guidance firms is not primarily driven by earnings warnings guidance.      
6.5 Differences in CAPM Beta and Earnings Properties 
Another competing explanation for the evidence of differential valuation is that 
short-term earnings of quarterly guidance firms are better indicators of their future 
earnings than are short-term earnings of non-guidance firms. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that investors assign higher to the short-term earnings of guidance firms. This 
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is consistent with prior literature that price-earnings relation is correlated with earnings 
persistence and future earnings growth (Kothari, 2001). Or, investors may respond more 
strongly to short-term earnings of quarterly guidance firms because they have lower risk 
(Kothari, 2001). To investigate the plausibility of the competing explanations I compare 
earnings persistence, risk and actual earnings growth up to four years ahead between the 
two groups of firms.  
Earnings persistence is captured by β1 from the regression model: Earnt+1 = α0 
+ β1Earnt + ɛt, where Earnt+1 is earnings (Compustat item IB) at year t+1 and Earnt is 
earnings at year t. Earnings growth is measured as the percentage change in earnings-
per-share over the specified period. Risk is proxied by the beta from the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM).  
The results in Table 15 reveal that there is a slight difference in the average 
values of CAPM beta between guidance and non-guidance firms. Recall that the 
discount rate is calculated as the risk-free rate, plus beta times an assumed market. 
Thus, a small difference in beta produces only an insignificant difference in the discount 
rate. To the extent that the CAPM beta captures risk, this finding suggests that the small 
difference cannot fully explain the results documented in Table 4. For the average 
annual earnings growth, I find that guidance firms have a smaller (larger) negative 
growth rate than non-guidance firms during the second (third) year subsequent to the 
pricing dates. However, the average earnings growth rates over the subsequent five 
years are not significantly different between the two groups of firms. In sum, the 
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analyses suggest that the differential valuation documented is unlikely driven by 
differences in risk, earnings persistence and earnings growth between the two groups of 
firms. 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
  Critics of earnings guidance repeatedly allege that firms, by frequently 
conditioning the market with short-term expectations, lead investors to overemphasize 
short-term performance and neglect long-term prospects. Others argue that, absent 
management forecasts, market myopia will continue because investors can derive short-
term expectations from other sources such as firms’ quarterly financial reports and 
analysts’ forecasts. They cite other reasons such as the rising popularity of speculative 
funds, the shift in taxation policy on capital gains and changes in the sell-side analysts’ 
commission rate system as the primary causes of market-short-termism.  
 Motivated by the ongoing debate, this study evaluates the relation between the 
earnings guidance practice and investor short-sightedness. Using an adaptation of 
Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model, I find that investors place significantly higher (lower) 
weight on short-term (long-term) earnings of quarterly guidance firms than on the 
corresponding earnings of non-guidance firms, and the differential weighting is not 
present for annual guidance firms. These findings are consistent with critics’ allegation 
that quarterly guidance leads to investor short-termism and that firms can redirect 
investor focus away from short-term performance by switching from quarterly to annual 
guidance. 
 However, there are other potential explanations for the main findings. For 
example, the differential weighting could be caused by the differences in earnings 
properties, risk, or accuracy of analysts’ forecasts between guidance and control firms. 
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Or, the findings could be attributed to error-in-variable biases. The univariate tests do 
not find significant differences on those dimensions between the two groups of firms, 
and the future-returns tests also suggest that measurement errors cannot be the full 
explanation. Overall, the results are more consistent with the explanation that 
differential weighting of quarterly guidance firms arises because investors myopically 
price the firms.  
  To gain insight on the question whether myopic pricing of quarterly guidance 
firms is driven by the market as a whole or by a subset of investors, I investigate the 
role of different types of institutional investors. Using Bushee’s (1998) classification, I 
find no evidence that mispricing is limited to (or exacerbated by) transient investors, 
implying that myopic pricing is a market-wide phenomenon. This study documents a 
positive relation between quarterly guidance and investor short-termism and thus adds 
to our understanding of the costs and benefits of providing quarterly guidance. 
 Future research may further investigate other factors that cause the equity 
market to be short-term oriented. In addition to quarterly earnings guidance, critics also 
argue that misaligned executive compensation contributes to investor short-termism. 
Thus, it would be worthwhile to investigate the impact of top management’s 
compensation structure on time horizon of their voluntary disclosures.  It would also be 
interesting to learn whether the relation between executive compensation structure and 
voluntary disclosure is “moderated” by firms’ governance. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Distribution 
 
           Panel A: Sample Selection Procedures 
1. Extract all Compustat firm-year observations from 1993 to 2009 and keep those  
with available data items.                                                                                                    91,578 
 2. Merge with IBES dataset to obtain necessary analyst forecast data items.                         46,328 
 3. Merge with Institutional Ownership dataset to obtain ownership and trading   
    data items.                                                                                                                            37,538 
 4. Merge with Value Line dataset to obtain analysts’ forecasts of future firm value  
    components.                                                                                                                         19,261 
 5. Merge with Guidance dataset and keep the firm-years that have either quarterly  
    or annual earnings guidance. 
         Quarterly earnings guidance sample                                                                                  4,559 
         Annual earnings guidance sample                                                                                       2,142 
 
    Panel B: Yearly Distribution of the Samples. 
 
   
 
        Firm-years* 
Year Quarterly Guidance  Annual Guidance 
2000   78                     55  
2001 337                     77  
2002 544                   154  
2003 597                   204  
2004 639                   249  
2005 554                   250  
2006 536                   289  
2007 482                   293  
2008 443                   306  
2009 349                   265  
   Total                          4,559                 2,142  
         *The firm-years do not include the one-to-one matched control firms. 
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TABLE 2 
 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests   
 
 
Guidance 
Non-
Guidance 
Difference 
 (p-value) 
 
Guidance 
Non-
Guidance 
Difference 
 (z-value) 
 
Guidance 
Non-
Guidance 
 
Guidance 
Non-
Guidance 
 
Guidance 
Non-
Guidance 
 
                  
 
Mean 
  
Median 
  
STDEV 
 
25th Percentile 
 
75th Percentile 
 
                  P 33.32 37.14   -3.82*** 
 
29.47 30.50   -1.03*** 
 
23.78 41.19 
 
18.57 19.87 
 
43.50 45.21 
 
   
  (0.000) 
   
  (0.000) 
          BV 12.24 14.06   -1.82*** 
 
10.27 11.56   -1.29*** 
 
8.44 12.73 
 
6.57 6.99 
 
15.85 18.54 
 
   
  (0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
          PVAX 0.44 0.49  -0.05** 
 
0.32 0.39  -0.07** 
 
1.36 1.28 
 
-0.14 -0.12 
 
0.89 0.96 
 
   
(0.044) 
   
(0.023) 
          PVTV 23.49 23.07     0.42 
 
18.86 17.05     1.81*** 
 
21.63 43.24 
 
10.52 9.97 
 
31.06 27.23 
 
   
(0.552) 
   
 (0.000) 
          CAR -0.01 0.00  -0.01** 
 
-0.04 -0.03  -0.01*** 
 
0.32 0.31 
 
-0.21 -0.17 
 
0.14 0.14 
 
   
(0.017) 
   
(0.001) 
          ALL_HOLD 85.40 73.81   11.59*** 
 
90.83 79.85   10.98*** 
 
16.93 23.97 
 
75.69 61.65 
 
100.00 93.16 
 
   
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
          TRA_HOLD 25.35 19.12     6.23*** 
 
22.93 17.99     4.94*** 
 
13.22 12.18 
 
15.26 10.01 
 
33.14 24.96 
 
   
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
          QIX_HOLD 50.82 44.32      6.50*** 
 
52.54 46.17     6.37*** 
 
14.68 16.16 
 
43.36 36.44 
 
61.13 54.01 
 
   
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
          DED_HOLD 9.23 10.37    -1.14 
 
9.70 8.51    1.19*** 
 
7.57 9.48 
 
5.24 4.12 
 
15.20 15.14 
 
   
 (0.129) 
   
(0.000) 
          ALL_VOL 101.42 81.22  20.20*** 
 
84.17 68.73   15.44*** 
 
64.27 59.71 
 
56.90 39.20 
 
124.73 101.29 
 
   
 (0.000) 
   
 (0.000) 
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(Table 2 continued) 
 
Guidance 
Non-
Guidance 
Difference 
(p-value) 
 
Guidance 
Non-
Guidance 
Difference 
(z-value) 
 
Guidance 
Non-
Guidance 
 
Guidance 
Non-
Guidance 
 
Guidance 
Non-
Guidance 
 
                  
 
Mean 
  
Median 
  
STDEV 
 
25th Percentile 
 
75th Percentile 
 
TRA_VOL 34.87 25.87    9.00*** 
 
30.37 22.20    8.17*** 
 
22.06 19.76 
 
18.55 11.65 
 
45.74 35.41 
   
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
         
QIX_VOL 55.45 44.35  11.10*** 
 
41.43 34.04    7.39*** 
 
41.84 35.98 
 
29.73 21.57 
 
62.76 49.64 
   
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
         
DED_VOL 11.10 11.00    0.10 
 
7.74 6.33    1.41*** 
 
11.44 17.62 
 
4.01 2.57 
 
13.67 12.00 
   
(0.140) 
   
(0.000) 
         
EARN_STD 0.35 0.37  -0.02** 
 
0.21 0.20     0.01 
 
0.52 0.52 
 
0.13 0.11 
 
0.38 0.45 
   
(0.031) 
   
 (0.191) 
         
NANALYSTS 11.74 12.45  -0.71*** 
 
10.00 11.00    -1.00 
 
6.85 8.69 
 
6.00 5.00 
 
16.00 18.00 
   
(0.000) 
   
 (0.720) 
         
AF_DISPER 0.11 0.15  -0.04*** 
 
0.06 0.10   -0.04*** 
 
0.25 0.21 
 
0.03 0.05 
 
0.12 0.18 
   
  (0.000) 
   
 (0.000) 
         
SIZE 7.89 7.92   -0.03 
 
7.70 7.77    -0.07 
 
1.42 1.51 
 
6.87 6.80 
 
8.78 8.95 
   
(0.372) 
   
  (0.318) 
         
M2B 1.37 1.37     0.00 
 
1.30 1.26    0.04*** 
 
0.50 0.62 
 
1.02 1.02 
 
1.62 1.59 
   
(0.751) 
   
 (0.008) 
          
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables and the results from univariate tests of their differences between guidance and non-guidance firms. The variables 
are defined in Appendix. P-values (z-values) are based on two-tailed t-tests (rank-sum tests). *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.   
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Analysis 
 
 
  Panel A. Correlation Matrix for Quarterly Guidance Sample 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Variable P BV PVAX PVTV CAR
ALL_ 
HOLD
TRA_  
HOLD
QIX_  
HOLD
DED_  
HOLD
ALL_  
VOL
TRA_  
VOL
QIX_   
VOL
DED_  
VOL
EARN_ 
STD
NANA-
LYSTS
AF_ 
DISPER SIZE M2B
P 1 0.5103* 0.5474* 0.6425* 0.0051 -0.0217 -0.1085* 0.0629* 0.0431* 0.0261* -0.0361* 0.0604* 0.0410* 0.0754* 0.2202* -0.3567* 0.5162* 0.3883*
BV 0.5411* 1 0.1278* 0.0887* 0.0284* 0.0430* -0.1333* 0.2206* -0.0154 -0.0163 -0.0984* 0.0595* -0.0433* 0.2360* -0.0374* -0.0256* 0.1521* -0.4747*
PVAX 0.6794* 0.2321* 1 0.6440* 0.024 -0.1299* -0.1854* 0.0057 -0.0493* -0.1516* -0.1633* -0.1114* -0.1034* -0.0217 0.1092* -0.2444* 0.3914* 0.4252*
PVTV 0.6681* 0.1506* 0.7367* 1 -0.0852* -0.0463* -0.1245* 0.0509* 0.0205 -0.0280* -0.0741* -0.0029 0.0332* -0.0689* 0.2714* -0.4197* 0.5085* 0.5823*
CAR -0.0322* 0.0005 -0.0074 -0.0803* 1 -0.0515* -0.0235 -0.0517* -0.0051 -0.0439* -0.014 -0.0577* -0.0104 0.0218 0.0075 0.0342* 0.0261* -0.0407*
ALL_HOLD 0.0023 0.0724* -0.0552* -0.0261* -0.0360* 1 0.6902* 0.6773* 0.3394* 0.6327* 0.6366* 0.5777* 0.4001* 0.0069 -0.1126* -0.0357* -0.3180* -0.0516*
TRA_HOLD -0.0698* -0.1195* -0.0930* -0.0680* 0.0188 0.5964* 1 0.2009* 0.0704* 0.6371* 0.8674* 0.4586* 0.2907* 0.0851* -0.1061* 0.0468* -0.3768* 0.0303*
QIX_HOLD 0.0246* 0.1638* 0.0057 0.0303* -0.0590* 0.6829* 0.1868* 1 -0.0067 0.3623* 0.2235* 0.4862* 0.1082* -0.0534* -0.0981* -0.0693* -0.1395* -0.1361*
DED_HOLD 0.0039 -0.0022 -0.0513* -0.0153 -0.0304* 0.3365* 0.0250* -0.0299* 1 0.1737* 0.0887* 0.0946* 0.5779* 0.01 0.0714* -0.0515* 0.0199 0.0727*
ALL_VOL 0.0288* 0.0023 -0.1035* -0.0329* -0.0254 0.4796* 0.4808* 0.3519* 0.1227* 1 0.8625* 0.9323* 0.6298* 0.0242 0.0217 0.0024 -0.1435* 0.0502*
TRA_VOL -0.0207 -0.0863* -0.0912* -0.0474* 0.0273* 0.5352* 0.8431* 0.1955* 0.0337* 0.7674* 1 0.6864* 0.4539* 0.0817* 0.0014 0.0378* -0.2179* 0.0589*
QIX_VOL 0.0502* 0.0527* -0.0874* -0.0242 -0.0447* 0.3704* 0.2408* 0.4157* 0.0380* 0.9392* 0.5408* 1 0.5121* -0.0136 0.0098 -0.0159 -0.1079* 0.0185
DED_VOL 0.0168 -0.0125 -0.0850* -0.0072 -0.0322* 0.2920* 0.1760* 0.0747* 0.4831* 0.6685* 0.3764* 0.5494* 1 0.0274* 0.1324* -0.0259* 0.0375* 0.1003*
EARN_STD 0.0866* 0.1440* 0.0818* 0.0284* 0.0215 0.014 0.0628* -0.0432* 0.0006 -0.0051 0.0470* -0.0357* 0.0114 1 -0.0063 0.2429* 0.0351* -0.2000*
NANALYSTS 0.1404* -0.0343* 0.0275* 0.1616* -0.0173 -0.1099* -0.1061* -0.1090* 0.0223 0.011 -0.0114 -0.0003 0.0817* -0.0036 1 -0.1779* 0.6588* 0.2608*
AF_DISPER -0.1351* -0.0344* -0.0797* -0.1444* 0.0244 -0.0406* 0.0300* -0.0648* -0.0189 -0.0203 0.009 -0.0315* -0.016 0.1199* -0.1245* 1 -0.2472* -0.3651*
SIZE 0.4091* 0.1546* 0.2550* 0.3996* -0.0284* -0.2791* -0.3739* -0.1412* -0.0293* -0.1129* -0.2297* -0.0556* 0.0128 -0.011 0.6492* -0.1555* 1 0.3830*
M2B 0.2935* -0.4170* 0.2750* 0.4109* -0.0617* -0.0618* 0.0296* -0.1240* 0.0447* 0.0270* 0.0492* -0.001 0.0603* -0.0846* 0.2335* -0.1387* 0.3711* 1
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(Table 3 continued) 
 
   Panel B. Correlation Matrix for Non-Guidance Sample 
   
    
 
 
The Spearman (Pearson) correlations are reported at the top (bottom) of the diagonal. * indicates that the correlation is statistically significant at a level of 10% or lower. 
All variables are defined in Appendix. 
Variable P BV PVAX PVTV CAR
ALL_ 
HOLD
TRA_  
HOLD
QIX_  
HOLD
DED_  
HOLD
ALL_  
VOL
TRA_  
VOL
QIX_   
VOL
DED_  
VOL
EARN_ 
STD
NANA-
LYSTS
AF_ 
DISPER SIZE M2B
P 1 0.5585* 0.5354* 0.5790* 0.0657* -0.0445* -0.0433* -0.0604* 0.0286* 0.0232 0.0138 0.0075 0.0658* 0.2498* 0.3678* -0.0781* 0.5772* 0.2984*
BV 0.7708* 1 0.2411* 0.0937* 0.0482* -0.0676* -0.1492* 0.0422* -0.0846* -0.0861* -0.1146* -0.0553* -0.0853* 0.3365* 0.1636* 0.1777* 0.2886* -0.5253*
PVAX 0.6827* 0.4961* 1 0.5180* 0.0461* -0.0851* -0.1097* -0.0264* -0.0640* -0.0629* -0.0587* -0.0666* -0.0507* 0.0789* 0.2150* -0.0685* 0.3813* 0.2994*
PVTV 0.8873* 0.5985* 0.6651* 1 -0.0307* -0.0013 0.0126 -0.0702* 0.0319* 0.0489* 0.0708* 0.0062 0.0806* -0.0198 0.3059* -0.2588* 0.4682* 0.5116*
CAR -0.0035 0.0181 0.01 -0.0502* 1 0.0135 0.0026 -0.0534* 0.0816* 0.0059 0.0099 -0.0119 0.0503* 0.0661* 0.0872* 0.0873* 0.0657* 0.0177
ALL_HOLD 0.0129 -0.0236 -0.0131 0.023 0.0159 1 0.7176* 0.7305* 0.5618* 0.6616* 0.6718* 0.5988* 0.5177* 0.1342* 0.1397* 0.1831* -0.1571* 0.0270*
TRA_HOLD -0.0275* -0.1233* -0.0800* 0.0068 0.0109 0.6577* 1 0.3269* 0.2723* 0.6752* 0.8854* 0.5258* 0.4021* 0.0997* 0.1081* 0.1112* -0.1990* 0.1327*
QIX_HOLD -0.0138 0.0497* -0.0006 -0.0159 -0.0388* 0.7929* 0.3139* 1 0.2269* 0.4198* 0.3233* 0.5006* 0.2445* 0.0937* 0.0679* 0.1096* -0.1134* -0.1122*
DED_HOLD 0.0789* -0.0107 0.0281* 0.0640* 0.0785* 0.4783* 0.1227* 0.0722* 1 0.3323* 0.2686* 0.2553* 0.6499* 0.0607* 0.2297* 0.0579* 0.0233 0.0950*
ALL_VOL 0.0330* -0.0552* -0.0151 0.0028 0.0289* 0.5287* 0.4993* 0.3353* 0.2827* 1 0.8696* 0.9460* 0.7075* 0.0419* 0.1769* 0.1115* -0.0529* 0.1357*
TRA_VOL 0.0181 -0.0903* -0.0256* 0.0279* 0.0152 0.5726* 0.8494* 0.2685* 0.1363* 0.7603* 1 0.7262* 0.5506* 0.0950* 0.1930* 0.1144* -0.0635* 0.1615*
QIX_VOL 0.0107 -0.0266* -0.0396* -0.0233 0.0215 0.4207* 0.2897* 0.3986* 0.1140* 0.9153* 0.5570* 1 0.5993* 0.0265* 0.1317* 0.0969* -0.0727* 0.0845*
DED_VOL 0.0694* -0.0296* 0.0585* 0.0246* 0.0365* 0.2832* 0.1406* 0.0196 0.5671* 0.6549* 0.3064* 0.4257* 1 0.0141 0.2638* 0.0408* 0.0821* 0.1711*
EARN_STD 0.2890* 0.3526* 0.1629* 0.2068* 0.0625* 0.0913* 0.0634* 0.0394* 0.0611* -0.0056 0.0952* -0.0505* -0.0214 1 0.1280* 0.3783* 0.1429* -0.1603*
NANALYSTS 0.2263* 0.1588* 0.2292* 0.1682* 0.0794* 0.2088* 0.0496* 0.0988* 0.2277* 0.1637* 0.1132* 0.1126* 0.1947* 0.1147* 1 0.0168 0.7140* 0.2040*
AF_DISPER -0.0344* 0.0661* 0.0411* -0.0643* 0.0203 0.0567* 0.0961* 0.0082 0.0011 0.0233 0.0744* 0.0007 -0.0083 0.1934* 0.0075 1 -0.0888* -0.3392*
SIZE 0.3572* 0.2603* 0.3531* 0.2652* 0.0263* -0.1421* -0.2041* -0.1238* 0.02 -0.002 -0.0727* -0.003 0.0814* 0.0826* 0.6767* -0.0369* 1 0.2819*
M2B 0.1183* -0.2866* 0.1675* 0.1512* -0.0226 0.0403* 0.1536* -0.0744* 0.0393* 0.0917* 0.1556* 0.0279* 0.0779* -0.0254* 0.1117* 0.1264* 0.2098* 1
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TABLE 4 
Regression Analysis of Price on Components of Firm Value 
 
 
 Pt = b0 + b1BVt + b2PVAXt +  b3PVTVt + b4GUIDEt + b5(GUIDE*BV)t + b6(GUIDE*PVAX)t + b7(GUIDE*PVTV)t + ɛt              (5) 
    
             Annual Guidance 
 
Quarterly Guidance 
    
Mean Coefficient 
 
Mean Coefficient 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Non-
Guidance  Guidance Difference 
 
Non-
Guidance  Guidance Difference 
Intercept 
 
0 
 
 2.242  5.372***    2.242 
 
 5.268*** 8.332*** 5.268*** 
    
(0.260) (0.000)  (0.260) 
 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
BV 
 
1 
 
1.238***  0.977***   1.239*** 
 
 1.068*** 1.067*** 1.068*** 
    
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PVAX 
 
+/- 
 
2.136*  2.826***   2.136* 
 
 2.952*** 4.402*** 2.952*** 
    
(0.064) (0.012)  (0.064) 
 
(0.005) (0.000) (0.005) 
PVTV 
 
+/- 
 
0.706***  0.681***   0.706*** 
 
 0.680*** 0.434***  0.680*** 
    
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GUIDE 
 
+/- 
   
   3.130 
   
 3.064 
      
  (0.105) 
   
(0.124) 
GUIDE*BV 
 
+/- 
   
-0.262* 
   
-0.001 
      
  (0.097) 
   
(0.992) 
GUIDE*PVAX 
 
+ 
   
   0.690 
   
  1.451** 
      
  (0.426) 
   
 (0.035) 
GUIDE*PVTV 
 
- 
   
  -0.025 
   
-0.246*** 
      
  (0.652) 
   
(0.002) 
 
 
Average Annual N 
 
         214   214  428 
 
    456   456 912 
 
 
 
The regression analyses test for differences in investors’ response to the firm value components of guidance and non-guidance 
firms. P is the share price at time t when the firm value variables are constructed; BV is the book value per share; PVAX is the 
present value of forecasted one-year-ahead abnormal earnings; PVTV is the present value of all forecasted abnormal earnings 
beyond the one-year horizon. GUIDE is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm provides quarterly or annual guidance and 
zero otherwise. The regressions are estimated yearly and the coefficients reported are the mean coefficients over the sample period 
(2000-2009) and the p-values (in parentheses) are two-tailed and based on a standard error of the coefficients. The standard errors 
are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West methodology with one lag. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Regression Analysis of Price on Components of Firm Value, Using a Reduced Sample 
 
 
Pt = b0 + b1BVt + b2PVAXt +  b3PVTVt + b4GUIDEt + b5(GUIDE*BV)t + b6(GUIDE*PVAX)t  
       +b7(GUIDE*PVTV)t + ɛt                                                                                                                                      (5)            
     
Variable 
 
Predicted Value/Sign 
 
Mean Coefficient 
Intercept 
 
0 
 
      4.867*** 
    
(0.009) 
BV 
 
1 
 
      1.049*** 
    
(0.000) 
PVAX 
 
+/- 
 
      3.005*** 
    
(0.006) 
PVTV 
 
+/- 
 
     0.701*** 
    
(0.000) 
GUIDE 
 
+/- 
 
3.103 
    
(0.160) 
GUIDE*BV 
 
+/- 
 
0.029 
    
(0.734) 
GUIDE*PVAX 
 
+ 
 
  1.424* 
    
(0.072) 
GUIDE*PVTV 
 
- 
 
     -0.264*** 
    
(0.008) 
Average Annual N 
   
428 
 
The regression analysis tests for whether differences in the results between the annual and quarterly guidance 
samples (Table 4) are due to the sample size difference between the two samples. This table repeats the valuation 
estimation using a reduced quarterly guidance sample. Specifically, for every year in the sample, I randomly select 
a number of quarterly guidance firms that equals the number of firms in the annual guidance sample. P is the share 
price at time t when the firm value variables are constructed; BV is the book value per share; PVAX is the present 
value of forecasted one-year-ahead abnormal earnings; PVTV is the present value of all forecasted abnormal 
earnings beyond the one-year horizon. GUIDE is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm provides quarterly 
guidance and zero otherwise. The regressions are estimated yearly and the coefficients reported are the mean 
coefficients over the sample period (2000-2009) and the p-values (in parentheses) are two-tailed and based on a 
standard error of the coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West 
methodology with one lag. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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TABLE 6 
 Differences in Firm Valuation before and after Inception of Guidance 
 
   Pt = b0 + b1BVt + b2PVAXt + b3PVTVt + b4GUIDEt + b5(GUIDE*BV)t + b6(GUIDE*PVAX)t + b7(GUIDE*PVTV)t  
 
          + b8POSTt + b9(POST*BV)t + b10(POST*PVAX)t + b11(POST*PVTV)t + b12(POST*GUIDE)t +           
          + b13(POST*GUIDE*BV)t + b14(POST*GUIDE*PVAX)t + b15(POST*GUIDE*PVTV)t + ɛt                        (6a)      
                         
 
        
    
Before Issuing 
Guidance 
   
After Issuing 
Guidance 
 
Difference 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
           Intercept 
 
0 
 
    10.384*** 
 
0 
 
     7.800*** 
 
    10.384*** 
    
(0.000) 
 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
BV 
 
1 
 
      0.984*** 
 
1 
 
      1.043*** 
 
      0.984*** 
    
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
PVAX 
 
+/- 
 
    2.929** 
 
+/- 
 
      1.730*** 
 
    2.929** 
    
(0.041) 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.041) 
PVTV 
 
+/- 
 
      0.788*** 
 
+/- 
 
      0.550*** 
 
      0.788*** 
    
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
GUIDE 
 
+/- 
 
-0.640 
 
+/- 
 
0.961 
 
-0.640 
    
 (0.826) 
   
(0.625) 
 
(0.826) 
GUIDE*BV 
 
+/- 
 
 0.222 
 
+/- 
 
0.111 
 
0.222 
    
 (0.160) 
   
(0.327) 
 
(0.160) 
GUIDE*PVAX 
 
0 
 
 0.560 
 
+ 
 
      3.774*** 
 
0.560 
    
 (0.762) 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.762) 
GUIDE*PVTV 
 
0 
 
         -0.054 
 
- 
 
     -0.241*** 
 
-0.054 
    
  (0.527) 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.527) 
POST 
 
0 
       
-2.386 
          
(0.341) 
POST*BV 
 
+/- 
       
0.059 
          
(0.643) 
POST*PVAX 
 
+/- 
       
-1.199 
          
(0.371) 
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(Table 6 continued) 
 
    
Before 
Issuing 
Guidance 
   
After 
Issuing 
Guidance 
 
Difference 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
           
POST*PVTV 
 
+/- 
       
 -0.237*** 
          
 (0.004) 
POST*GUIDE 
 
+/- 
       
   1.601 
          
  (0.645) 
POST*GUIDE*BV 
 
+/- 
       
  -0.111 
          
  (0.567) 
POST*GUIDE*PVAX + 
       
3.214* 
          
  (0.097) 
POST*GUIDE*PVTV - 
       
  -0.187* 
          
  (0.078) 
  
  N – Firm-years                                                                                                                                         1,892 
 
The pooled regression analysis in the last column tests for differences in differential valuation of each firm value component 
before and after guidance firms initial their first quarterly guidance. P is the share price at time t when the firm value variables 
are constructed; BV is the book value per share; PVAX is the present value of forecasted abnormal earnings one year ahead; 
PVTV is the present value of forecasted abnormal earnings beyond one year ahead. GUIDE is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the firm provides quarterly guidance and zero otherwise; POST is an indicator variable that equals zero (one) if the firm-
year is two years before (after) the inception of the first guidance. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  
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TABLE 7 
Differences in Firm Valuation before and after Discontinuation of Guidance 
 
 
Pt = b0 + b1BVt + b2PVAXt + b3PVTVt + b4GUIDEt + b5(GUIDE*BV)t + b6(GUIDE*PVAX)t + b7(GUIDE*PVTV)t  
 
       + b8POSTt + b9(POST*BV)t + b10(POST*PVAX)t + b11(POST*PVTV)t + b12(POST*GUIDE)t +           
       + b13(POST*GUIDE*BV)t + b14(POST*GUIDE*PVAX)t + b15(POST*GUIDE*PVTV)t + ɛt                         (6b)      
                         
 
    
Before 
Stopping 
Guidance 
   
After 
Stopping 
Guidance 
 
Difference 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
           Intercept 
 
0 
 
  2.837* 
 
0 
 
    3.712** 
 
  2.837* 
    
(0.066) 
 
  
(0.032) 
 
(0.066) 
BV 
 
1 
 
      1.210*** 
 
1 
 
      1.018*** 
 
      1.210*** 
    
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
PVAX 
 
+/- 
 
      3.018*** 
 
+/- 
 
      4.017*** 
 
      3.018*** 
    
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
PVTV 
 
+/- 
 
      0.811*** 
 
+/- 
 
      0.615*** 
 
      0.811*** 
    
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
GUIDE 
 
+/- 
 
       -2.217 
 
+/- 
 
  -5.433** 
 
-2.217 
    
(0.305) 
   
(0.011) 
 
(0.305) 
GUIDE*BV 
 
+/- 
 
0.090 
 
+/- 
 
0.024 
 
0.090 
    
(0.380) 
   
(0.827) 
 
(0.380) 
GUIDE*PVAX 
 
+ 
 
  1.163* 
 
0 
 
  -1.800** 
 
  1.163* 
    
(0.062) 
   
(0.033) 
 
(0.062) 
GUIDE*PVTV 
 
- 
 
  -0.156** 
 
0 
 
      0.227*** 
 
   -0.156** 
    
(0.030) 
   
(0.003) 
 
(0.030) 
POST 
 
0 
       
0.874 
          
(0.705) 
POST*BV 
 
+/- 
       
 -0.191* 
          
(0.096) 
POST*PVAX 
 
+/- 
       
1.163 
          
(0.230) 
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(Table 7 continued) 
    
Before 
Stopping 
Guidance 
   
After 
Stopping 
Guidance 
 
Difference 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
           
POST*PVTV 
 
+/- 
       
  -0.196** 
          
(0.014) 
POST*GUIDE 
 
+/- 
       
    -3.217 
          
(0.289) 
POST*GUIDE*BV 
 
+/- 
       
    -0.066 
          
    (0.657) 
POST*GUIDE*PVAX 
 
- 
       
   -2.962** 
          
(0.012) 
POST*GUIDE*PVTV 
 
+ 
       
    0.384*** 
          
    (0.000) 
           N – Firm-years 
         
704 
 
 
The pooled regression analysis in the last column tests for differences in differential valuation of each firm value component 
before and after guidance firms discontinue their quarterly guidance practice. P is the share price at time t when the firm 
value variables are constructed; BV is the book value per share; PVAX is the present value of forecasted abnormal earnings 
one year ahead; PVTV is the present value of forecasted abnormal earnings beyond one year ahead. GUIDE is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the firm provides quarterly guidance and zero otherwise; POST is an indicator variable that equals 
zero (one) if the firm-year is one year before (after) the quarterly guidance firm stops providing guidance. *,**,*** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
TABLE 8 
 Effects of Different Types of Institutional Investors on Firm Valuation 
 
Pt = b0 + b1BVt + b2PVAXt + b3PVTVt + b4GUIDEt + b5(GUIDE*BV)t + b6(GUIDE*PVAX)t  
 
       + b7(GUIDE*PVTV)t + b8INSTt + b9(INST*BV)t + b10(INST*PVAX)t + b11(INST*PVTV)t  
 
       + b12(INST*GUIDE)t + b13(INST*GUIDE*BV)t + b14(INST*GUIDE*PVAX)t  
 
       + b15(INST*GUIDE*PVTV)t + ɛt                                                                                                       (7) 
 
    
INST=  
TRA_HOLD 
 
INST= 
QIX_HOLD 
 
INST= 
DED_HOLD 
 
INST= 
ALL_HOLD 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
           Intercept 
 
0 
 
     5.401*** 
 
     6.207*** 
 
1.934 
 
     5.849*** 
    
(0.010) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.258) 
 
(0.006) 
BV 
 
1 
 
     0.992*** 
 
     0.991*** 
 
      1.055*** 
 
   0.967*** 
    
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
PVAX 
 
+/- 
 
     3.034*** 
 
     3.516*** 
 
      2.289*** 
 
     3.214*** 
    
(0.007) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.000) 
PVTV 
 
+/- 
 
     0.670*** 
 
     0.687*** 
 
      0.812*** 
 
     0.705*** 
    
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
GUIDE 
 
+/- 
 
0.919 
 
0.173 
 
     3.152** 
 
2.391 
    
(0.621) 
 
(0.938) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.229) 
GUIDE*BV 
 
+/- 
 
  0.220* 
 
0.187 
 
0.067 
 
0.193 
    
(0.062) 
 
(0.198) 
 
(0.341) 
 
(0.110) 
GUIDE*PVAX 
 
+ 
 
  2.068* 
 
    1.646** 
 
2.181 
 
     2.332*** 
    
(0.086) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.006) 
GUIDE*PVTV 
 
- 
 
    -0.273*** 
 
    -0.195*** 
 
     -0.284*** 
 
    -0.340*** 
    
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.001) 
INST 
 
+/- 
 
-2.807 
 
 -3.822* 
 
4.747 
 
-2.140 
    
(0.405) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.141) 
 
(0.244) 
INST*BV 
 
+/- 
 
0.246 
 
0.136 
 
0.070 
 
0.237 
    
(0.151) 
 
(0.422) 
 
(0.556) 
 
(0.111) 
INST*PVAX 
 
+/- 
 
-0.073 
 
-2.800 
 
1.062 
 
-1.257 
    
(0.961) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.482) 
 
(0.618) 
INST*PVTV 
 
+/- 
 
0.020 
 
0.095 
 
   -0.196** 
 
-0.049 
    
(0.875) 
 
(0.311) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.547) 
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(Table 8 continued) 
    
INST=  
TRA_HOLD 
 
INST= 
QIX_HOLD 
 
INST= 
DED_HOLD 
 
INST= 
ALL_HOLD 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
 
Mean 
Coefficient 
           
INST*GUIDE 
 
+/- 
 
4.288 
 
    6.614** 
 
     -1.247 
 
0.592 
    
(0.173) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.592) 
 
(0.829) 
INST*GUIDE*BV 
 
+/- 
 
  -0.420** 
 
-0.320* 
 
     -0.121 
 
   -0.419** 
    
(0.031) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.263) 
 
 (0.017) 
INST*GUIDE*PVAX 
 
+ 
 
    -1.145 
 
2.613 
 
     -1.475 
 
     -0.960 
    
(0.619) 
 
(0.355) 
 
(0.538) 
 
 (0.707) 
INST*GUIDE*PVTV 
 
- 
 
0.044 
 
-0.193 
 
0.111 
 
    0.258** 
    
(0.693) 
 
 (0.153) 
 
(0.472) 
 
 (0.046) 
Average Annual N 
   
912 
 
912 
 
912 
 
912 
 
The regression analyses test for the effects of different types of institutional investors on the valuation of firm value 
components of quarterly guidance firms. P is the share price at time t when the firm value variables are constructed; BV is the 
book value per share; PVAX is the present value of forecasted abnormal earnings one year ahead; PVTV is the present value 
of forecasted abnormal earnings beyond one year ahead; GUIDE is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm provides 
quarterly guidance and zero otherwise; TRA_HOLD equals total shares held by transient investors, divided by total shares 
outstanding; QIX_HOLD equals total shares held by quasi-index investors, divided by total shares outstanding; DED_HOLD 
equals total shares held by quasi-index investors, divided by total shares outstanding; ALL_HOLD equals total shares held by 
all types of institutional investors, divided by total shares outstanding. The regressions are estimated yearly and the 
coefficients reported are the mean coefficients over the sample period (2000-2009) and the p-values (in parentheses) are two-
tailed and based on a standard error of the coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-
West methodology with one lag. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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TABLE 9 
 
Regression Analysis of Future Returns on Current Components of Firm Value 
 
        CAR(I)t = b0 + b1BVCt + b2PVAXCt + b3PVTVCt + b4GUIDEt + b5(GUIDE*BVC)t     
                         + b6(GUIDE*PVAXC)t  + b7(GUIDE*PVTVC)t + ɛt                                                                      (9) 
                                                                                                                          
    
I = One 
Year Ahead 
I = One 
Year  Ahead 
  I = One     
Year Ahead 
 
I = Two 
Year Ahead 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Non-
Guidance  
 
Guidance  
 
Interaction  
 
Interaction  
Intercept 
 
+/- 
 
0.018 
 
-0.042 
 
0.018 
 
0.081 
    
(0.674) 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.674) 
 
(0.445) 
BVC 
 
- 
 
0.026 
 
0.089 
 
0.026 
 
-0.094 
    
(0.742) 
 
(0.216) 
 
 (0.742) 
 
(0.560) 
PVAXC 
 
- 
 
1.421 
 
0.792 
 
1.421 
 
1.668 
    
(0.241) 
 
(0.437) 
 
 (0.241) 
 
(0.201) 
PVTVC 
 
+ 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.003 
 
   -0.048 
 
-0.069 
    
(0.129) 
 
(0.886) 
 
 (0.129) 
 
(0.453) 
GUIDE 
 
+/- 
     
   -0.060** 
 
-0.117 
        
 (0.021) 
 
(0.133) 
GUIDE*BVC 
 
+/- 
     
    0.063** 
 
  0.221* 
        
 (0.021) 
 
(0.087) 
GUIDE*PVAXC 
 
- 
     
   -0.629** 
 
    -1.629 
        
 (0.047) 
 
(0.221) 
GUIDE*PVTVC 
 
+ 
     
   0.044* 
 
0.031 
        
 (0.095) 
 
(0.654) 
Avg. Annual N 
   
     456 
 
       456 
 
912  
 
912  
 
The regression analyses test for the relation between current firm value components and future abnormal returns. CAR is 
the buy-and-hold size-adjusted abnormal returns over the specified period. The compounding beings one month after the 
firm value variables are constructed using the second Value Line report released during the year; BVC equals book value 
per share, deflated by price at t=0; PVAXC is the present value of forecasted one-year-ahead abnormal earnings, deflated 
by price at t=0; PVTVC is the present value of all forecasted abnormal earnings beyond the one-year horizon, deflated by 
price at t=0; GUIDE is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm provides quarterly guidance and zero otherwise. 
The regressions are estimated yearly and the coefficients reported are the mean coefficients over the sample period (2000-
2009) and the p-values (in parentheses) are two-tailed and based on a standard error of the coefficients. The standard 
errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West methodology with one lag. *,**,*** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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TABLE 10 
Future Price Reversal Test: Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
 
Rp = α + b1HML + b2MRFR + b3SML + e                              (10) 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns of Guidance Hedge Portfolios 
  
6 Months 
 
12 months 
 
18 months 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
Intercept -     -0.020*** 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
  
     (0.001) 
 
(0.427) 
 
(0.209) 
HML +/- 0.232 
 
-0.122 
 
0.047 
  
(0.301) 
 
(0.641) 
 
(0.749) 
MRFR +/-    -0.414** 
 
   -0.943*** 
 
   -0.524*** 
  
(0.013) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
SML +/- -0.398 
 
  -0.542** 
 
    -0.523*** 
  
(0.125) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.004) 
 
Panel B: Hedge Portfolio Abnormal Returns of Non-Guidance Firms 
 
       
  
6 Months 
 
12 months 
 
18 months 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
Intercept 0 -0.004 
 
0.012 
 
0.011 
  
(0.822) 
 
(0.278) 
 
(0.270) 
HML +/- -0.063 
 
-0.061 
 
     -0.023 
  
(0.888) 
 
(0.833) 
 
 (0.935) 
MRFR +/-     -1.075*** 
 
    -1.057*** 
 
    -1.094*** 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
 (0.000) 
SML +/- -0.611 
 
  -0.710** 
 
 -0.615* 
  
(0.231) 
 
(0.049) 
 
 (0.071) 
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(Table 10 continued) 
 
Panel C: Difference in Hedge Portfolio Abnormal Returns between Guidance and Non-Guidance                         
                Firms 
         
  
6 Months 
 
12 months 
 
18 months 
  
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
  
Intercept -        -0.007 
 
 -0.020* 
 
-0.017* 
  
  
(0.625) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.062) 
  HML +/- 0.156 
 
0.050 
 
0.069 
  
  
(0.720) 
 
(0.856) 
 
(0.790) 
  MRFR +/-   0.553* 
 
    0.456** 
 
     0.569*** 
  
  
(0.082) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.004) 
  SML +/- 0.332 
 
0.131 
 
0.092 
  
  
(0.502) 
 
(0.699) 
 
(0.774) 
   
Panel D: Univariate Test of Average Monthly Hedge Portfolio Returns between Guidance and  
                Non-Guidance Firms 
          
  
6 Months 
 
12 Months 
 
      18 Months 
  
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
   
Guidance -      -0.020*** 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.009 
   
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.133) 
 
(0.134) 
   Non-Guidance 0 -0.001 
 
0.012 
 
0.009 
   
  
(0.919) 
 
(0.267) 
 
(0.362) 
   Difference - -0.019 
 
 -0.022* 
 
-0.018 
   
  
(0.207) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.124) 
    
Panel A and Panel B report future abnormal returns from Fama-French three-factor model for the quarterly guidance and non-
guidance samples, respectively. The dependent variable is the equally weighted monthly returns of the hedge portfolios. To 
form the portfolios, I decile-rank firms based on their proportion of short-term earnings over the share price [PVAXt /Pt]. The 
portfolios take a long (short) position in firms that are in the highest (lowest) decile. Then, the monthly differences in returns 
between the two deciles of firms are regressed on a set of control variables that accounts for the effects of size (SML), market 
(MRFR) and book-to-market (HML) (see Fama and French (1993) for the construction of these factors). Firms remain in the 
portfolios for the specified number of months (6, 12 or 18 months) after portfolio formation (the time when the second Value 
Line report for the fiscal year is released) and the portfolios are reset yearly. In Panel C, the monthly portfolio returns are 
calculated as the difference in monthly portfolio returns between the guidance and non-guidance portfolios. Panel D reports 
the results from the univariate mean-comparison tests of monthly portfolio returns between the two portfolios. The p-values 
are reported in parentheses, with *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 11 
Univariate Tests of Regression Residuals 
 
Panel A. Analysis of Residuals from Equation (5) 
  
    
  
 
Guidance Mean Non-Guidance Mean 
 
Difference                             
(p-value) 
Signed Residuals 0.000 0.000   0.000 
   
(1.00) 
    Absolute Residuals 7.939 8.437        -0.498*** 
   
 (0.007) 
    Variance of Residuals           143.256              144.776        -1.520 
   
 0.898 
 
   Panel B. Correlation Analysis Between Guide Indicator and Residuals from Equation (5) 
    
  
Guide 
  
Signed Residuals 0.000 
                  1.00 
    
   Absolute Residuals      -0.028*** 
    0.007 
    
   Variance of Residuals              -0.001 
    0.898 
   
 
Panel A contains the results from the analyses of residuals, which is derived from regression Equation (5) for the 
quarterly guidance sample: Pjt = b0 + b1BVjt + b2PVAXjt +  b3PVTVjt + b4GUIDEjt + b5(GUIDE*BV)jt + 
b6(GUIDE*PVAX)jt + b7(GUIDE*PVTV)jt + ɛjt. Panel B reports the results from the correlation analysis between 
the residuals and the indicator variable GUIDE, which equals one if the firm provides quarterly guidance and 
zero otherwise. The p-values are reported in parentheses, with *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.   
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TABLE 12 
Comparison of Analyst Forecast Error between Guidance and Non-Guidance Firms 
     
 
Panel A. Mean Analysts' Forecast Error by Forecast Time Horizon   
 
     
 
Mean Analyst Forecast Error 
 
Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
     Guidance 0.012 0.024 0.035 0.044 
     Non-Guidance 0.014 0.025 0.034 0.043 
          Difference      -0.002*** -0.001 0.001 0.001 
     p-value 0.005 0.729 0.329 0.643 
 
 
    Panel B. Annual Mean Analyst Forecast Error for One-year-ahead Earnings   
 
     
 
Mean Analyst Forecast Error 
Year Guidance Non-Guidance Difference p-value 
2000 0.018 0.014 0.004 0.364 
2001 0.016 0.017         -0.001 0.569 
2002 0.011 0.014         -0.003* 0.083 
2003 0.013 0.010     0.003** 0.023 
2004 0.010 0.014      -0.004*** 0.000 
2005 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.621 
2006 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.780 
2007 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.525 
2008 0.018 0.029      -0.011*** 0.000 
 
Panel A represents the mean Value Line analyst forecast error for the one-, two-, three- and four-year-ahead 
earnings. Analyst forecast error equal: absolute value of ((Actual_EPS – Forecasted_EPS) /Pricet-1), where 
Actual_EPS and Forecasted_EPS are obtained from Value Line data files. The guidance sample contains quarterly 
guidance firms. For each forecast time horizon, the mean forecast error is calculated as the average forecast error 
throughout the entire sample period. Panel B reports the annual mean analyst forecast error of guidance and non-
guidance firms for the one-year-ahead earnings. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.      
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TABLE 13 
Regression Analysis of Price on Decomposition of Firm Value  
with Matching Analyst Forecast Error 
 
 
Pt = b0 + b1BVt + b2PVAXt +  b3PVTVt + b4GUIDEt + b5(GUIDE*BV)t + b6(GUIDE*PVAX)t  
       +b7(GUIDE*PVTV)t + ɛt                                                                                                                                        
     
Variable 
 
Predicted Value/Sign 
 
Mean Coefficient 
Intercept 
 
0 
 
    3.506** 
    
(0.030) 
BV 
 
1 
 
      1.094*** 
    
(0.000) 
PVAX 
 
+/- 
 
      3.428*** 
    
(0.008) 
PVTV 
 
+/- 
 
     0.780*** 
    
(0.000) 
GUIDE 
 
+/- 
 
5.256 
    
(0.102) 
GUIDE*BV 
 
+/- 
 
0.026 
    
(0.792) 
GUIDE*PVAX 
 
+ 
 
  1.489* 
    
(0.080) 
GUIDE*PVTV 
 
- 
 
     -0.351*** 
    
(0.003) 
Average Annual N 
   
912 
 
The regression analysis tests for investors’ differential response to the firm value components of quarterly guidance 
firms. In addition to the five factors (see Equation (8)), the control firms are matched to guidance firms on one-year-
ahead analyst forecast error. P is the share price at time t when the firm value variables are constructed; BV is the book 
value per share; PVAX is the present value of forecasted one-year-ahead abnormal earnings; PVTV is the present value 
of all forecasted abnormal earnings beyond the one-year horizon. GUIDE is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
firm provides quarterly guidance and zero otherwise. The regressions are estimated yearly and the coefficients reported 
are the mean coefficients over the sample period (2000-2009) and the p-values (in parentheses) are two-tailed and based 
on a standard error of the coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West 
methodology with one lag. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 14 
Regression Analysis of Price on Decomposition of Firm Value 
Excluding Earnings Warnings Guidance 
 
Pt = b0 + b1BVt + b2PVAXt +  b3PVTVt + b4GUIDEt + b5(GUIDE*BV)t + b6(GUIDE*PVAX)t       
        + b7(GUIDE*PVTV)t + ɛt                                                                                                                                                                                 
       
 
   
Excluding Guidance 
Frequency < 2 
 
Excluding Earnings Shortfall 
Guidance 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Value/Sign 
 
Mean Coefficient 
 
Mean Coefficient 
Intercept 
 
0 
 
3.245 
 
     7.040*** 
    
(0.131) 
 
(0.006) 
BV 
 
1 
 
      1.055*** 
 
     0.865*** 
    
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
PVAX 
 
+/- 
 
    3.339** 
 
    2.957** 
    
(0.044) 
 
(0.018) 
PVTV 
 
+/- 
 
      0.737*** 
 
     0.665*** 
    
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
GUIDE 
 
+/- 
 
3.618 
 
0.285 
    
(0.948) 
 
(0.922) 
GUIDE*BV +/- 
 
-0.011 
 
  0.243* 
    
 (0.948) 
 
(0.074) 
GUIDE*PVAX + 
 
   1.455* 
 
    1.977** 
    
 (0.059) 
 
(0.027) 
GUIDE*PVTV - 
 
    -0.219** 
 
   -0.212** 
    
 (0.036) 
 
 (0.039) 
       Average Annual N 
  
703 
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The regression analyses attempt to mitigate the effect of “earnings warnings” guidance using two different approaches. 
The first approach (column three) excludes firm-years that have less than two management earnings forecasts. The 
second approach (column four) excludes firm-years that contain management forecasts that are all labeled as “earnings 
shortfall” by Value Line. P is the share price at time t when the firm value variables are constructed; BV is the book 
value per share; PVAX is the present value of forecasted one-year-ahead abnormal earnings; PVTV is the present value 
of all forecasted abnormal earnings beyond the one-year horizon. GUIDE is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
firm provides quarterly guidance and zero otherwise. The regressions are estimated yearly and the coefficients reported 
are the mean coefficients over the sample period (2000-2009) and the p-values (in parentheses) are two-tailed and based 
on a standard error of the coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West 
methodology with one lag. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 15 
Univariate Analysis of Differences in CAPM Beta and Earnings Properties  
between Guidance and Non-Guidance Firms 
 
 
Non-
Guidance 
 
Guidance 
 
Difference         
 
p-value 
CAPM Beta 1.094 
 
1.120 
 
-0.026*** 
 
0.000 
        Earnings Persistence 0.891 
 
0.888 
 
     0.003 
 
0.986 
        Earnings Growth 
       Year 1 to Year 2 -0.152 
 
-0.156 
 
     0.004 
 
0.884 
        Year 2 to Year 3 -0.328 
 
-0.150 
 
-0.178*** 
 
0.000 
        Year 3 to Year 4 -0.082 
 
-0.143 
 
     0.062** 
 
0.019 
        Year 4 to Year 5 -0.190 
 
-0.217 
 
     0.027 
 
0.400 
        Average -0.188 
 
-0.166 
 
    -0.021 
 
0.717 
         
Beta is estimated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) over the past five years. Earnings persistence is 
captured by β1 from the regression model: Earnt+1 = α0 + β1Earnt + ɛt, where Earnt+1 is earnings (Compustat item 
IB) at year t+1 and Earnt is earnings at year t. Earnings growth is measures the growth in earnings-per-share over 
the specified period. Average growth and average errors are the averages of each respective variable over the four 
years. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.    
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TABLE 16 
Propensity Score Logistic Regression Model 
 
Prob (GUIDEt = 1) = F(γ0 + γ1SIZEt-1 + γ2M2Bt-1 + γ3EARN_STDt + γ4NANALYSTSt-1  
                                        + γ5AF_DISPERt-1 + μt                                                                                 (8) 
 
Variable 
 
Mean Coefficient 
Intercept 
 
     1.327*** 
  
(0.002) 
SIZE 
 
    -0.105*** 
  
(0.004) 
M2B 
 
0.012 
  
(0.842) 
EARN_STD   -0.092** 
  
(0.033) 
NANALYSTS      0.032*** 
  
(0.000) 
AF_DISPER     -1.211*** 
  
(0.000) 
   Avg. Pseudo R-squared 0.094 
 
 
The logistic regressions generate propensity scores for both guidance and non-guidance firms. Equation (8) is 
estimated yearly and the control firms are matched to the guidance firms based on the closest propensity score. 
SIZEt-1 is the natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at year t-1; M2Bt-1 is the natural log of a firm’s market-
to-book ratio at year t-1; EARN_STDt is earnings volatility over the past 12 quarters, with a minimum of eight 
available quarters; NANALYSTSt-1 is the number of analysts following the firm at the last quarter of year t-1; and 
AF_DISPER is analysts’ forecast dispersion at the last quarter of year t-1. Since Value Line forecasts are made 
by one analyst, the variables – NANALYSTS and AF_DISPER – are calculated using the IBES data files. The 
coefficients reported are the mean coefficients over the sample period (2000-2009), and the p-values (in 
parentheses) are two-tailed and based on a standard error of the coefficients. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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FIGURE 1 
Focuses of This Study In Relation to Prior Studies 
 
 
 
This figure is structurally based on Cheng, Subramanyam and Yang (2007). It illustrates the endogenous nature of earnings 
guidance and the focuses of this study in relation to related prior literature. H1 and H2 are the main hypotheses of this study. 
H1 tests the relation between earnings guidance and investor short-termism. H2 tests whether the relation is “moderated” by 
transient investors.  
 
Earnings Guidance Market Focus on 
Short-term Earnings
Managerial Focus on 
Short-term Earnings
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Short-term Earnings 
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FIGURE 2 
Timeline of Value Line Forecasts and Earnings Guidance 
 
 
 
 
This timeline illustrates the approximate timing of Value Line analysts’ forecasts in relation to management earnings 
guidance. Value Line analysts provide quarterly forecasts of key variables in this study. The second forecast report is 
chosen as the reference point (time t=0) and for constructing the firm value components. Specifically, Short-term Earnings 
are the forecasted earnings for the upcoming fiscal year, discounted to time t=0; and Long-term Earnings are the sum of 
forecasted earnings beyond the one-year horizon, discounted to time t=0. Value Line forecasts future earnings up to four 
years ahead, and the forecast of share price for the fourth year is used to proxy for all subsequent abnormal earnings.  
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FIGURE 3 
Temporal Trend of Differential Responses to Short-Term and Long-Term Components 
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This figure shows the temporal trend of over- and undervaluation of quarterly guidance firms documented in 
Table 4. The top graph presents the three-year moving averages of the differential response (b6 from column 8 of 
Table 4) to the forecasted one-year-ahead abnormal earnings. The bottom graph presents the three-year moving 
average of the differential response (b7 from column 8 of Table 4) to the forecasted abnormal earnings beyond 
one year ahead. 
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FIGURE 4 
Temporal Trend of Association between Current Firm Value Components and Future Returns  
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This figure shows the temporal trend of the association between current firm value components of quarterly 
guidance firms and their one-year-ahead future returns. The top graph presents the three-year moving averages 
of the differential association (b7 from column 5 of Table 9) between current long-term earnings and one-year-
ahead abnormal returns. The bottom graph presents the three-year moving average of the differential 
association (b6 from column 5 of Table 9) between current short-term earnings and one-year-ahead abnormal 
returns. The order of the graphs is reversed for the purpose of comparing with Figure 3. 
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Appendix 
Definition of Variables 
 
 
 
 
BV = Book value per share 
PVAX = Present value of forecasted abnormal earnings over next year 
PVTV = Present value of forecasted abnormal earnings beyond one-year-ahead 
CAR = Cumulative monthly compounded size-adjusted abnormal returns 
ALL_HOLD = Total shares held by all types of institutional investors, divided by total shares 
outstanding  
TRA_HOLD = Total shares held by transient investors, divided by total shares outstanding 
QIX_HOLD = Total shares held by quasi-index investors, divided by total shares outstanding 
DED_HOLD = Total shares held by dedicated investors, divided by total shares outstanding 
Inst_VOL = Shares traded by all types of institutional investors, divided by total shares 
outstanding 
 
TRA_VOL = Shares traded by transient institutional investors, divided by total shares 
outstanding 
 
QIX_VOL = Shares traded by quasi-index institutional investors, divided by total shares 
outstanding 
 
DED_VOL = Shares traded by dedicated institutional investors, divided by total shares 
outstanding 
 
EARN_STD = Earnings volatility, measured as the standard deviation of earnings 
(COMPUSTAT item IB) over the past 12 quarters, with a minimum of 8 
quarters available 
NANALYSTS = Number of analysts following from IBES database 
AF_DISPER = IBES analysts forecast dispersion 
SIZE = Natural log of market value of equity 
M2B = Natural log of market-to-book ratio 
GUIDE = An indicator variable that equals one if the firm provides quarterly or annual 
guidance and zero otherwise  
POST = An indicator variable that equals one if the year is in the pre-guidance period 
and zero otherwise  
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